0x815

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4853883

[The article is an analysis of the cooperation agreement signed between Finland and China by two Finnish scholars.]

Geopolitical tensions were prominently featured in the discussions between the two heads of state [of Finland and China during Finland's president in Beijing this week]. In contrast to the laudatory tone of the Chinese media, the the Finnish President's official press release stated that the central topic of the talks was Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, as had been the focus of previous visits of EU leaders as well. [Finnish President] Stubb, who earlier stated [Chinese President] Xi could end the war in Ukraine with “just one phone call”, reportedly focused on convincing the Chinese president of the importance of the conflict for Finland and the rest of the European Union, emphasizing that Putin could not be trusted.

Yet apparently, China cannot be completely trusted either. Far from boosting cooperation, the New Joint Action Plan signed by Finland and China represents a reality different from the praises in Chinese media. Strikingly, the plan, which describes the main avenues of Sino-Finnish future cooperation, is only five pages long [and] the focal points of the plan give an impression of shrinking cooperation.

[...]

The Arctic domain is entirely absent from the new Sino-Finnish action plan. In contrast to the 2019 plan, which envisioned deepening Arctic cooperation in the fields of law, research and marine technology, the new plan does not mention the Arctic at all.

The omission is rather unsurprising. Since the signing of the 2019 plan, the Arctic security situation has changed dramatically and Finland’s Arctic projects involving Chinese stakeholders have been quietly cancelled or put on ice. Examples include the termination of the planned Arctic railway project connecting Norway’s Kirkenes and Rovaniemi, and the Finnish security authorities’ refusal to provide satellite services to China in the Arctic Space Center in Sodankylä or to rent an airport for Arctic research flights near the Finnish Defence Forces’ firing range in Kemijärvi.

[...]

This state of affairs reflects broader suspicion towards Chinese intentions, as the Finnish media have increasingly reported on the covert activities of Chinese “united front groups” and scholars with connections to military-civilian fusion projects, for instance. Finally, in 2023, a Chinese container vessel, on its way to St. Petersburg via the Arctic Northeastern passage, destroyed a gas pipeline linking Finland and Estonia. Before its ill-fated journey, the vessel, Newnew Polar Bear, was celebrated in the Chinese media as a harbinger of increased Arctic cooperation between China and Russia. Whether the incident was intentional or not (the investigation is still ongoing), it caused a flurry of media speculation on a possible Chinese grey-zone operation in the Baltic Sea.

Since officially launching its Polar Silk Road in 2017, China has attempted to expand its presence within the Arctic countries through economic, diplomatic and scientific cooperation, but it now seems that the Arctic leg of the Belt and Road is not extending to Finland or into its neighbouring Nordic countries either. Consequently, China's Arctic expansion now increasingly relies on Russia.

Finland’s distancing from Arctic cooperation with China reflects deeper dynamics than mere domestic concerns. As the great power competition between “democratic” and “authoritarian” camps intensifies, Finland is increasingly “de-risking” from China, while integrating with its Western partners.

[...]

Finland’s changed approach to China provides the latest example for the Chinese leadership that there is a price to be paid for its “strategic straddle”; attempting to maintain business-as-usual relations with Europe while de facto enabling a brutal invasion in Ukraine. Naturally, this straddle is most severely felt in Russian neighbour states, including Finland, which shares the longest border with Russia in Europe.

[...]

Symbolic of the deteriorating Sino-Finnish relations, two giant pandas leased to Ähtäri zoo by China in 2017 are set to return to China eight years ahead of schedule due to financial problems. One might ask whether this reflects a broader reality for China’s Arctic cooperation in the future?

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4853883

[The article is an analysis of the cooperation agreement signed between Finland and China by two Finnish scholars.]

Geopolitical tensions were prominently featured in the discussions between the two heads of state [of Finland and China during Finland's president in Beijing this week]. In contrast to the laudatory tone of the Chinese media, the the Finnish President's official press release stated that the central topic of the talks was Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, as had been the focus of previous visits of EU leaders as well. [Finnish President] Stubb, who earlier stated [Chinese President] Xi could end the war in Ukraine with “just one phone call”, reportedly focused on convincing the Chinese president of the importance of the conflict for Finland and the rest of the European Union, emphasizing that Putin could not be trusted.

Yet apparently, China cannot be completely trusted either. Far from boosting cooperation, the New Joint Action Plan signed by Finland and China represents a reality different from the praises in Chinese media. Strikingly, the plan, which describes the main avenues of Sino-Finnish future cooperation, is only five pages long [and] the focal points of the plan give an impression of shrinking cooperation.

[...]

The Arctic domain is entirely absent from the new Sino-Finnish action plan. In contrast to the 2019 plan, which envisioned deepening Arctic cooperation in the fields of law, research and marine technology, the new plan does not mention the Arctic at all.

The omission is rather unsurprising. Since the signing of the 2019 plan, the Arctic security situation has changed dramatically and Finland’s Arctic projects involving Chinese stakeholders have been quietly cancelled or put on ice. Examples include the termination of the planned Arctic railway project connecting Norway’s Kirkenes and Rovaniemi, and the Finnish security authorities’ refusal to provide satellite services to China in the Arctic Space Center in Sodankylä or to rent an airport for Arctic research flights near the Finnish Defence Forces’ firing range in Kemijärvi.

[...]

This state of affairs reflects broader suspicion towards Chinese intentions, as the Finnish media have increasingly reported on the covert activities of Chinese “united front groups” and scholars with connections to military-civilian fusion projects, for instance. Finally, in 2023, a Chinese container vessel, on its way to St. Petersburg via the Arctic Northeastern passage, destroyed a gas pipeline linking Finland and Estonia. Before its ill-fated journey, the vessel, Newnew Polar Bear, was celebrated in the Chinese media as a harbinger of increased Arctic cooperation between China and Russia. Whether the incident was intentional or not (the investigation is still ongoing), it caused a flurry of media speculation on a possible Chinese grey-zone operation in the Baltic Sea.

Since officially launching its Polar Silk Road in 2017, China has attempted to expand its presence within the Arctic countries through economic, diplomatic and scientific cooperation, but it now seems that the Arctic leg of the Belt and Road is not extending to Finland or into its neighbouring Nordic countries either. Consequently, China's Arctic expansion now increasingly relies on Russia.

Finland’s distancing from Arctic cooperation with China reflects deeper dynamics than mere domestic concerns. As the great power competition between “democratic” and “authoritarian” camps intensifies, Finland is increasingly “de-risking” from China, while integrating with its Western partners.

[...]

Finland’s changed approach to China provides the latest example for the Chinese leadership that there is a price to be paid for its “strategic straddle”; attempting to maintain business-as-usual relations with Europe while de facto enabling a brutal invasion in Ukraine. Naturally, this straddle is most severely felt in Russian neighbour states, including Finland, which shares the longest border with Russia in Europe.

[...]

Symbolic of the deteriorating Sino-Finnish relations, two giant pandas leased to Ähtäri zoo by China in 2017 are set to return to China eight years ahead of schedule due to financial problems. One might ask whether this reflects a broader reality for China’s Arctic cooperation in the future?

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4853256

To whom it may concern.

[The article is an analysis of the cooperation agreement signed between Finland and China by two Finnish scholars.]

Geopolitical tensions were prominently featured in the discussions between the two heads of state [of Finland and China during Finland's president in Beijing this week]. In contrast to the laudatory tone of the Chinese media, the the Finnish President's official press release stated that the central topic of the talks was Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, as had been the focus of previous visits of EU leaders as well. [Finnish President] Stubb, who earlier stated [Chinese President] Xi could end the war in Ukraine with “just one phone call”, reportedly focused on convincing the Chinese president of the importance of the conflict for Finland and the rest of the European Union, emphasizing that Putin could not be trusted.

Yet apparently, China cannot be completely trusted either. Far from boosting cooperation, the New Joint Action Plan signed by Finland and China represents a reality different from the praises in Chinese media. Strikingly, the plan, which describes the main avenues of Sino-Finnish future cooperation, is only five pages long [and] the focal points of the plan give an impression of shrinking cooperation.

[...]

The Arctic domain is entirely absent from the new Sino-Finnish action plan. In contrast to the 2019 plan, which envisioned deepening Arctic cooperation in the fields of law, research and marine technology, the new plan does not mention the Arctic at all.

The omission is rather unsurprising. Since the signing of the 2019 plan, the Arctic security situation has changed dramatically and Finland’s Arctic projects involving Chinese stakeholders have been quietly cancelled or put on ice. Examples include the termination of the planned Arctic railway project connecting Norway’s Kirkenes and Rovaniemi, and the Finnish security authorities’ refusal to provide satellite services to China in the Arctic Space Center in Sodankylä or to rent an airport for Arctic research flights near the Finnish Defence Forces’ firing range in Kemijärvi.

[...]

This state of affairs reflects broader suspicion towards Chinese intentions, as the Finnish media have increasingly reported on the covert activities of Chinese “united front groups” and scholars with connections to military-civilian fusion projects, for instance. Finally, in 2023, a Chinese container vessel, on its way to St. Petersburg via the Arctic Northeastern passage, destroyed a gas pipeline linking Finland and Estonia. Before its ill-fated journey, the vessel, Newnew Polar Bear, was celebrated in the Chinese media as a harbinger of increased Arctic cooperation between China and Russia. Whether the incident was intentional or not (the investigation is still ongoing), it caused a flurry of media speculation on a possible Chinese grey-zone operation in the Baltic Sea.

Since officially launching its Polar Silk Road in 2017, China has attempted to expand its presence within the Arctic countries through economic, diplomatic and scientific cooperation, but it now seems that the Arctic leg of the Belt and Road is not extending to Finland or into its neighbouring Nordic countries either. Consequently, China's Arctic expansion now increasingly relies on Russia.

Finland’s distancing from Arctic cooperation with China reflects deeper dynamics than mere domestic concerns. As the great power competition between “democratic” and “authoritarian” camps intensifies, Finland is increasingly “de-risking” from China, while integrating with its Western partners.

[...]

Finland’s changed approach to China provides the latest example for the Chinese leadership that there is a price to be paid for its “strategic straddle”; attempting to maintain business-as-usual relations with Europe while de facto enabling a brutal invasion in Ukraine. Naturally, this straddle is most severely felt in Russian neighbour states, including Finland, which shares the longest border with Russia in Europe.

[...]

Symbolic of the deteriorating Sino-Finnish relations, two giant pandas leased to Ähtäri zoo by China in 2017 are set to return to China eight years ahead of schedule due to financial problems. One might ask whether this reflects a broader reality for China’s Arctic cooperation in the future?

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4768962

Ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Brazil visit on November 20, Brasilia has junked China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), becoming the second BRICS country after India to reject Beijing’s multi-billion dollar venture.

Earlier in December 2023, Italy, the only G7 country to have signed for BRI, also withdrew from China’s vast infrastructure initiative.

This move by Brazil—an influential player in the BRICS bloc—signals rising concerns about the long-term implications of China’s expanding global footprint through the BRI.

Prioritizing Strategic Autonomy

Under President Lula da Silva’s leadership, Brazil seeks to strengthen its ties with China while avoiding the formal commitments associated with joining the BRI.

Brazilian officials are actively pursuing Chinese investments without formal accession to the BRI, reflecting the country’s desire to maintain strategic autonomy while exploring various infrastructure and trade projects with China.

In an interview with the Brazilian newspaper O Globo, Celso Amorim, Brazil’s special presidential adviser for international affairs [...] clarified that Brazil does not view Chinese trade and infrastructure projects as “an insurance policy,” stating, “We are not entering into a treaty.”

[...]

Ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Brazil visit on November 20, Brasilia has junked China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), becoming the second BRICS country after India to reject Beijing’s multi-billion dollar venture.

Earlier in December 2023, Italy, the only G7 country to have signed for BRI, also withdrew from China’s vast infrastructure initiative.

This move by Brazil—an influential player in the BRICS bloc—signals rising concerns about the long-term implications of China’s expanding global footprint through the BRI.

Prioritizing Strategic Autonomy

Under President Lula da Silva’s leadership, Brazil seeks to strengthen its ties with China while avoiding the formal commitments associated with joining the BRI.

Brazilian officials are actively pursuing Chinese investments without formal accession to the BRI, reflecting the country’s desire to maintain strategic autonomy while exploring various infrastructure and trade projects with China.

In an interview with the Brazilian newspaper O Globo, Celso Amorim, Brazil’s special presidential adviser for international affairs [...] clarified that Brazil does not view Chinese trade and infrastructure projects as “an insurance policy,” stating, “We are not entering into a treaty.”

[...]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4765221

[The article is originally published by AP.]

On the edge of Peru’s coastal desert [...] the megaport of Chancay, a $1.3 billion project majority-owned by the Chinese shipping giant Cosco, is turning this outpost of bobbing fishing boats into an important node of the global economy. China’s President Xi Jinping inaugurates the port Thursday during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Peru.

The development [...] has met a skeptical response from impoverished villagers, who say it is depriving them of fishing waters and bringing no economic benefit to locals.

“Our fishing spots no longer exist here. They destroyed them,” said 78-year-old fisherman Julius Caesar — “like the emperor of Rome” — gesturing toward the dockside cranes. [...]

The Peruvian government hopes the port 60 kilometers (37 miles) north of Lima will become a strategic transshipment hub for the region, opening a new line connecting South America to Asia and speeding trade across the Pacific for Peru’s blueberries, Brazil’s soybeans and Chile’s copper, among other exports. Officials cite the port’s potential to generate millions of dollars in revenues and turn coastal cities into so-called special economic zones with tax breaks to lure investment.

“We Peruvians are focused primarily on the well-being of Peruvians,” Foreign Minister Elmer Schialer told The Associated Press.

But many of Chancay’s 60,000 residents are unconvinced. Fishermen returning to port with smaller catches complain that they have already lost out.

The dredging of the port — which sucked sediment from the seabed to create a shipping channel 17 meters (56 feet) deep — has ruined fish breeding grounds, locals said.

“I’ve been out in the water all day and I’m always needing to venture farther,” said Rafael Ávila, a 28-year-old fisherman with sand in his hair, returning to shore empty-handed and exhausted.

“This used to be enough,” he said, pointing at his painted dinghy. “Now I need a larger, more expensive boat to reach the fish.”

[...]

With some of the world’s largest container ships to berth at Chancay Port in January 2025, residents also fear the arrival of pollution and oil spills. In 2022, a botched tanker delivery at La Pampilla refinery nearby sent thousands of barrels of crude oil spilling into Peru’s famously biodiverse waters, killing countless fish and putting legions of fishermen out of work.

Today a glance at the moribund town center, featuring mostly empty seafood restaurants, tells the story of diminished fishing stocks and decimated tourism even without the port being operational.

The port’s breakwater changed the currents and destroyed good surfing conditions, locals said, affecting everyone from ice vendors to truckers to restaurant owners. “No to the megaport” is spray-painted on a wall overlooking the waterfront.

“This port is a monster that’s come here to screw us,” said 40-year-old Rosa Collantes, cleaning and gutting slimy drum fish on the shore. “People come to the port and they say ‘Wow, tremendous!’ but they don’t see the reality.”

[...]

Der Tiefwasserport, der bis 2032 insgesamt fünfzehn Containerbrücken erhalten soll, ist nicht nur für Peru, sondern auch für China ein Megaprojekt. Er gilt als wichtiges Teil der neuen chinesischen Seidenstraße. Und deshalb nutzt Chinas Präsident Xi Jining auch seine Visite beim Gipfel der Asiatisch-Pazifischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (Apec) in Lima, um die extrem moderne Anlage an diesem Donnerstag gemeinsam mit der peruanischen Interims-Präsidentin Dina Boluarte einzuweihen.

[...]

Diesen Plan hat auch Raúl Pérez Reyes betont: „Unser Ziel ist es, das Singapur Lateinamerikas zu werden“, wirbt der [Raúl Pérez Reyes] Verkehrsminister von Peru. Chancay solle den gesamten Handel mit Asien abwickeln. Dabei geht es nicht nur um die Verschiffung von peruanischen Waren, sondern auch um Produkte aus Nachbarländern wie Brasilien, Bolivien, Paraguay oder Venezuela und Argentinien.

[...]

„Deshalb ist der Bau neuer Autobahnen, von Hightech-Industrieparks und die Ansiedlung von Dienstleistungsgewerbe geplant. Jobs sollen rund um Chancay en Gros entstehen und damit werben nicht nur die peruanischen Verantwortlichen, sondern auch Cosco Shipping“, fasst der Soziologe das Gesamtvorhaben zusammen. Begeistert ist er davon nicht.

Kein Wunder, denn mit dem Arbeitsplatz-Argument wird gern von den Versäumnissen abgelenkt: Im Hafen von Chancay haben peruanische Offizielle nichts zu melden. Cosco Shipping, das chinesische Staatsunternehmen, hält 60 Prozent der Anteile und gibt bei allem den Ton an.

[...]

Chancay sei ein „Dual-Use-Port, der eben auch militärisch genutzt“ werden könne, ärgern sich US-Militärs. Die USA verlieren seit rund zwei Jahrzehnten auf ökonomischer, politischer und militärischer Ebene an Einfluss in Mittel- wie Südamerika. Chancay ist ein Symbol dafür. Allerdings auch für das Versagen der peruanischen Institutionen, denn nicht die Nationale Hafenbehörde (APN) entscheidet, wer an den Terminals ablegen, arbeiten und mit Waren handeln darf, sondern allein Cosco.

[...]

Umwelt, Artenschutz? Egal

Dadurch kontrolliert das Staatsunternehmen die kostspieligen Schiffsrouten, diktiert Preise, kann Güter billiger handeln. Als das bekannt wurde, sorgte es in Peru für Proteste. Der Verdacht der Korruption machte die Runde. Doch statt die Vorwürfe zu untersuchen, sorgten der Kongress, das Parlament, per Gesetz dafür, dass alles nachträglich legalisiert wurde, kritisiert Alejandro Chirinos.

[...]

Ein Umweltgutachten, das der deutsche Biologe Stefan Austermühle im Auftrag von CooperAcción und der peruanischen Menschenrechtskoordination durchgeführt hat, weist auf offene Fragen und Defizite in der offiziellen Bewertung von Cosco hin. „Aber letztlich wurde alles durchgewunken“, kritisiert Chirinos. Im Ergebnis seien die Brutgebiete [von in der Region heimischen Vogelarten] existenziell gefährdet.

[...]

Auch die lokalen Fischer klagen schon jetzt, vor der Nutzung des Megahafens, über sinkende Fangquoten und weniger Vielfalt im Netz. Zudem müssen sich tausende Familien in der 60.000-Einwohner-Stadt darauf einstellen, im Rahmen der nächsten Bauetappen des Hafens enteignet zu werden. „Alles wurde über die Köpfe der lokalen Bevölkerung entschieden. Partizipation Fehlanzeige“, kritisiert der Soziologe von CooperAcción. Das ist recht typisch in Peru. Allerdings habe sich das unter Interims-Präsidentin Dina Boluarte verschärft, die nur über fünf Prozent Zustimmung der Bevölkerung verfügt und gegen die wegen Korruption ermitteln wird.

[The article is originally published by AP.]

On the edge of Peru’s coastal desert [...] the megaport of Chancay, a $1.3 billion project majority-owned by the Chinese shipping giant Cosco, is turning this outpost of bobbing fishing boats into an important node of the global economy. China’s President Xi Jinping inaugurates the port Thursday during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Peru.

The development [...] has met a skeptical response from impoverished villagers, who say it is depriving them of fishing waters and bringing no economic benefit to locals.

“Our fishing spots no longer exist here. They destroyed them,” said 78-year-old fisherman Julius Caesar — “like the emperor of Rome” — gesturing toward the dockside cranes. [...]

The Peruvian government hopes the port 60 kilometers (37 miles) north of Lima will become a strategic transshipment hub for the region, opening a new line connecting South America to Asia and speeding trade across the Pacific for Peru’s blueberries, Brazil’s soybeans and Chile’s copper, among other exports. Officials cite the port’s potential to generate millions of dollars in revenues and turn coastal cities into so-called special economic zones with tax breaks to lure investment.

“We Peruvians are focused primarily on the well-being of Peruvians,” Foreign Minister Elmer Schialer told The Associated Press.

But many of Chancay’s 60,000 residents are unconvinced. Fishermen returning to port with smaller catches complain that they have already lost out.

The dredging of the port — which sucked sediment from the seabed to create a shipping channel 17 meters (56 feet) deep — has ruined fish breeding grounds, locals said.

“I’ve been out in the water all day and I’m always needing to venture farther,” said Rafael Ávila, a 28-year-old fisherman with sand in his hair, returning to shore empty-handed and exhausted.

“This used to be enough,” he said, pointing at his painted dinghy. “Now I need a larger, more expensive boat to reach the fish.”

[...]

With some of the world’s largest container ships to berth at Chancay Port in January 2025, residents also fear the arrival of pollution and oil spills. In 2022, a botched tanker delivery at La Pampilla refinery nearby sent thousands of barrels of crude oil spilling into Peru’s famously biodiverse waters, killing countless fish and putting legions of fishermen out of work.

Today a glance at the moribund town center, featuring mostly empty seafood restaurants, tells the story of diminished fishing stocks and decimated tourism even without the port being operational.

The port’s breakwater changed the currents and destroyed good surfing conditions, locals said, affecting everyone from ice vendors to truckers to restaurant owners. “No to the megaport” is spray-painted on a wall overlooking the waterfront.

“This port is a monster that’s come here to screw us,” said 40-year-old Rosa Collantes, cleaning and gutting slimy drum fish on the shore. “People come to the port and they say ‘Wow, tremendous!’ but they don’t see the reality.”

[...]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4764066

Archived link

The choices, and the stakes, would remain very similar to what they were in February 2022, says Historian Anne Applebaum, senior fellow at the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University and the School of Advanced International Studies.

"Either we [the Western democracies] inflict enough economic pressure and military pain to convince Russia that the war can never be won, or we deal with the far more ominous, and far more expensive, consequences of Ukraine’s loss."

“Land for peace” sounds nice, but the president of Russia isn’t fighting for land. Putin is fighting not to conquer Pokrovsk but to destroy Ukraine as a nation. He wants to show his own people that Ukraine’s democratic aspirations are hopeless. He wants to prove that a whole host of international laws and norms, including the United Nations Charter and the Geneva conventions, no longer matter. His goal is not to have peace but to build concentration camps, torture civilians, kidnap 20,000 Ukrainian children, and get away with it—which, so far, he has.

Putin will truly stop fighting only if he loses the war, loses power, or loses control of his economy. And there is plenty of evidence that he fears all three, despite his troops’ slow movement forward. He would not have imported thousands of North Korean soldiers if he had an infinite number of Russians to replace the more than 600,000 soldiers whom he has lost to injury or death. He would not have paid American YouTubers to promote anti-Ukrainian propaganda if he wasn’t worried by the American public’s continued support for Ukraine. His economy is in trouble: Russian inflation is rising fast; Russian interest rates are now at 21 percent; Russian industries particularly vulnerable to sanctions, such as liquefied natural gas, are suffering. The Russian navy was humiliated in the Black Sea. The Russian military has still not recaptured territory lost in Russia’s Kursk province, conquered by the Ukrainians last summer.

Archived link

The choices, and the stakes, would remain very similar to what they were in February 2022, says Historian Anne Applebaum, senior fellow at the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University and the School of Advanced International Studies.

"Either we [the Western democracies] inflict enough economic pressure and military pain to convince Russia that the war can never be won, or we deal with the far more ominous, and far more expensive, consequences of Ukraine’s loss."

“Land for peace” sounds nice, but the president of Russia isn’t fighting for land. Putin is fighting not to conquer Pokrovsk but to destroy Ukraine as a nation. He wants to show his own people that Ukraine’s democratic aspirations are hopeless. He wants to prove that a whole host of international laws and norms, including the United Nations Charter and the Geneva conventions, no longer matter. His goal is not to have peace but to build concentration camps, torture civilians, kidnap 20,000 Ukrainian children, and get away with it—which, so far, he has.

Putin will truly stop fighting only if he loses the war, loses power, or loses control of his economy. And there is plenty of evidence that he fears all three, despite his troops’ slow movement forward. He would not have imported thousands of North Korean soldiers if he had an infinite number of Russians to replace the more than 600,000 soldiers whom he has lost to injury or death. He would not have paid American YouTubers to promote anti-Ukrainian propaganda if he wasn’t worried by the American public’s continued support for Ukraine. His economy is in trouble: Russian inflation is rising fast; Russian interest rates are now at 21 percent; Russian industries particularly vulnerable to sanctions, such as liquefied natural gas, are suffering. The Russian navy was humiliated in the Black Sea. The Russian military has still not recaptured territory lost in Russia’s Kursk province, conquered by the Ukrainians last summer.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4757140

The EU executive’s proposal to postpone the implementation of the regulation on imported deforestation for one year was approved by the Brussels hemicycle with 371 votes in favour, 240 against, and 30 abstentions. On the final vote, socialists, greens and leftists opposed it, with the same compactness with which the popular and far-right supported the text, while the liberals split.

The EPP, which had tabled 15 controversial amendments to the Commission’s new text, announced before the vote that it was withdrawing some of the most significant ones: the proposal for a two-year delay and several exemptions for traders on supply chain control charges. According to a statement on the sidelines of the vote by Christine Schneider, a People’s Party MEP who signed all of the amendments, the EPP withdrew the amendments because it got reassurances from the European Commission in return, particularly the commitment to review the guidelines for companies and make sure to avoid an overlap of bureaucratic burdens between companies.