[The article is an analysis of the cooperation agreement signed between Finland and China by two Finnish scholars.]
Geopolitical tensions were prominently featured in the discussions between the two heads of state [of Finland and China during Finland's president in Beijing this week]. In contrast to the laudatory tone of the Chinese media, the the Finnish President's official press release stated that the central topic of the talks was Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, as had been the focus of previous visits of EU leaders as well. [Finnish President] Stubb, who earlier stated [Chinese President] Xi could end the war in Ukraine with “just one phone call”, reportedly focused on convincing the Chinese president of the importance of the conflict for Finland and the rest of the European Union, emphasizing that Putin could not be trusted.
Yet apparently, China cannot be completely trusted either. Far from boosting cooperation, the New Joint Action Plan signed by Finland and China represents a reality different from the praises in Chinese media. Strikingly, the plan, which describes the main avenues of Sino-Finnish future cooperation, is only five pages long [and] the focal points of the plan give an impression of shrinking cooperation.
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The Arctic domain is entirely absent from the new Sino-Finnish action plan. In contrast to the 2019 plan, which envisioned deepening Arctic cooperation in the fields of law, research and marine technology, the new plan does not mention the Arctic at all.
The omission is rather unsurprising. Since the signing of the 2019 plan, the Arctic security situation has changed dramatically and Finland’s Arctic projects involving Chinese stakeholders have been quietly cancelled or put on ice. Examples include the termination of the planned Arctic railway project connecting Norway’s Kirkenes and Rovaniemi, and the Finnish security authorities’ refusal to provide satellite services to China in the Arctic Space Center in Sodankylä or to rent an airport for Arctic research flights near the Finnish Defence Forces’ firing range in Kemijärvi.
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This state of affairs reflects broader suspicion towards Chinese intentions, as the Finnish media have increasingly reported on the covert activities of Chinese “united front groups” and scholars with connections to military-civilian fusion projects, for instance. Finally, in 2023, a Chinese container vessel, on its way to St. Petersburg via the Arctic Northeastern passage, destroyed a gas pipeline linking Finland and Estonia. Before its ill-fated journey, the vessel, Newnew Polar Bear, was celebrated in the Chinese media as a harbinger of increased Arctic cooperation between China and Russia. Whether the incident was intentional or not (the investigation is still ongoing), it caused a flurry of media speculation on a possible Chinese grey-zone operation in the Baltic Sea.
Since officially launching its Polar Silk Road in 2017, China has attempted to expand its presence within the Arctic countries through economic, diplomatic and scientific cooperation, but it now seems that the Arctic leg of the Belt and Road is not extending to Finland or into its neighbouring Nordic countries either. Consequently, China's Arctic expansion now increasingly relies on Russia.
Finland’s distancing from Arctic cooperation with China reflects deeper dynamics than mere domestic concerns. As the great power competition between “democratic” and “authoritarian” camps intensifies, Finland is increasingly “de-risking” from China, while integrating with its Western partners.
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Finland’s changed approach to China provides the latest example for the Chinese leadership that there is a price to be paid for its “strategic straddle”; attempting to maintain business-as-usual relations with Europe while de facto enabling a brutal invasion in Ukraine. Naturally, this straddle is most severely felt in Russian neighbour states, including Finland, which shares the longest border with Russia in Europe.
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Symbolic of the deteriorating Sino-Finnish relations, two giant pandas leased to Ähtäri zoo by China in 2017 are set to return to China eight years ahead of schedule due to financial problems. One might ask whether this reflects a broader reality for China’s Arctic cooperation in the future?