Finance

The People's Bank of China (PBoC) lowered the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) for banks by 50bps, the second reduction this year aimed at bolstering a stuttering economy. The change, which takes effect today, Sept. 27, was signaled earlier in the week by Governor Pan Gongsheng, bringing the weighted average RRR to 6.6%.

This move will free up about CNY 1 trillion in new lending, with the central bank leaving room for another cut this year.

Additionally, the PBoC trimmed the 7-day reverse repo rate by 20bps to 1.5%. This rate is used to determine the nation's key lending rates. It also stated interest rates for 14-day reverse repos, as well as temporary repos and reverse repos, will continue to be adjusted in line with changes to the 7-day reverse repo rate. China has ramped up the rollout of policy initiatives this week, with its top decision-making body, the Politburo, pledging to introduce further fiscal and monetary support measures to prevent further deterioration of the econom

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/3202701

China’s problem is essentially that it has too much debt.

The main role of debt is to bring forward demand from the future. [...] China’s stimulus has kept on increasing since 2008, until it peaked with the end of the pandemic.

Now China risks entering a classic ‘debt trap’ where new loans are taken out to repay existing debt – not to create new demand. In other words, the debt is no longer being used to generate growth. In turn, this risks generating a downward spiral.

[...]

The underlying problem, of course, is China’s massive housing bubble. It was probably the largest ever seen. And it has been bursting for some time, with home sales slumping, as the Bloomberg chart shows.

[...]

China needs to urgently boost [domestic] consumption and downsize manufacturing.

[...]

• Housing is currently unaffordable for most people
• The real estate market is an outsize risk for the economy – it is 29% of GDP, and 70% of China’s urban wealth
• Given China’s ageing population, it seems likely [that housing sales] volume could drop at least another 20% before the market bottoms
• That will mean China will need to import a lot less oil, metals, plastics and everything else connected to the bubble.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/2778752

Demand for new Estonian government bonds totalled EUR 821mn, which was four times more than the EUR 200mn offered, the Ministry of Finance announced, ERR reports.

Altogether 28 professional investors and 7,304 retail investors participated in the public bond offering. Retail investors subscribed to bonds worth EUR 29mn and will receive 100% of the amount subscribed to. Estonian professional investors will receive 26% and international investors 13% on average.

Trading in Estonian bonds will begin on the Nasdaq Tallinn stock exchange on 17 September 2024. The bonds will mature on 16 September 2026, yielding a fixed annual interest rate of 3.3%.

China's shadow bank Zhongzhi exploited risky and potentially illegal practices before its collapse last year

• Zhongzhi units engaged in potentially illegal practices before Chinese shadow bank's collapse, records show
• Practices involved guaranteeing returns; using new investor funds to pay returns on existing wealth management products
• Chinese regulators had prohibited capital pool business and guaranteeing of returns to prevent financial instability
• Zhongzhi and relevant units did not respond to Reuters queries about such practices

Zhongzhi Enterprise Group, a former leader of China's shadow banking sector that declared insolvency last year, used aggressive and potentially illegal sales practices to sustain its operations as it lurched toward collapse, according to new records.

China's years-long property boom had propelled Beijing-headquartered Zhongzhi to the top of the country's $18 trillion asset-management industry and made it a key player in a shadow banking sector the size of the French economy. Asset managers such as Zhongzhi sell wealth-management products to investors. The proceeds are then channeled by licensed trust firms like its Zhongrong unit to developers and other companies that cannot tap bank funding directly because of poor creditworthiness or other reasons.

Previously unreported details show that about a year before its financial troubles burst into the open, Zhongzhi units were paying returns to existing investors in wealth-management products by using funds from new investors, and promising individual investors lucrative returns that belied the group's exposure to a deepening property crisis.

China's trust firms are known as shadow banks because they operate outside many of the rules that govern commercial lenders. But China's top banking regulator in 2018 specified that financial institutions including shadow banks and asset managers should not set up capital pools, to prevent them from using money from new sales to cover returns on existing wealth-management products, nor should they guarantee returns on wealth-management products.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/2595239

Major Russian banks have called on the central bank to take action to counter a yuan liquidity deficit, which has led to the rouble tumbling to its lowest level since April against the Chinese currency and driven yuan swap rates into triple digits.

The rouble fell by almost 5% against the yuan on Sept. 4 on the Moscow Stock Exchange (MOEX) after the finance ministry's plans for forex interventions implied that the central bank's daily yuan sales would plunge in the coming month to the equivalent of $200 million.

The central bank had been selling $7.3 billion worth of yuan per day during the past month. The plunge coincided with oil giant Rosneft's 15 billion yuan bond placement, which also sapped liquidity from the market.

"We cannot lend in yuan because we have nothing to cover our foreign currency positions with," said Sberbank CEO German Gref, stressing that the central bank needed to participate more actively in the market. The yuan has become the most traded foreign currency on MOEX after Western sanctions halted exchange trade in dollars and euros, with many banks developing yuan-denominated products for their clients. Yuan liquidity is mainly provided by the central bank through daily sales and one-day yuan swaps, as well as through currency sales by exporting companies.

Chinese banks in Russia, meanwhile, are avoiding currency trading for fear of secondary Western sanctions.

Vanke had a short-term refinancing gap of about 12 billion yuan ($1.69 billion) at the end of June due to a spike in long-term debt within a year, according to Bloomberg calculations based on company data. That’s the first time Vanke’s cash balance has failed to cover interest-bearing debt maturing in less than a year since at least 2014.

As a bellwether for China’s real estate crisis, Vanke’s debt troubles underscore how even the highest quality developers have been ensnared by the unprecedented property downturn. While it’s managed to avoid a default so far, Vanke’s connections with the nation’s financial and government-backed entities means its distress could eclipse the turmoil wreaked by defaults at rivals China Evergrande Group and Country Garden Holdings Co.

[...]

China’s housing rescue package in May is losing steam as home sales slump deepened in August and prices are expected to plummet further. Concerns intensified in recent weeks after a string of disappointing earnings reports from consumer companies and a cut to China’s growth forecast by UBS Group AG. The downgrade reflects an emerging consensus that the country may miss its growth target of around 5% in 2024.

[...]

Vanke’s earnings report on Friday showed how much the extended housing slump is taking its toll on China’s fourth-biggest developer by sales. The company posted a net loss of 9.85 billion yuan for the six months ended June 30, its first semi-annual loss since at least 2003. That’s higher than the upper range flagged by the firm in July, and compares with an annual profit of 12.2 billion yuan last year.

Vanke’s loss signals its finances took a sharp hit in the second quarter, considering it lost just 362 million yuan in the first three months. The slowdown in China’s market has deepened since then, as sales and prices continue to fall. Local governments are dialing back intervention over pricing of new residential projects, driving developers to offer deep discounts to lure buyers.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/2261331

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Hungarian media outlet 444 has compiled a list of the outstanding debts of the state of Hungary, primarily using data from the Public Debt Management Centre (ÁKK). Their findings show that in just three years, the Hungarian government has accumulated considerable debt to China. By the end of the second quarter of this year, Hungary owed HUF 71.79 billion (EUR 182 million) to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a debt first incurred in the last quarter of 2022.

Earlier, in the second quarter of 2022, Hungary secured a loan for the construction of the Budapest-Belgrade railway line. So far, they have drawn down HUF 341.6 billion (EUR 866 million) for this project. The total investment for the railway amounts to HUF 750 billion (EUR 1.9 billion), of which 85% is being financed by loans and 15% by co-financing. Additionally, in the spring of this year, Hungary requested a loan of EUR 1 billion in complete secrecy by the end of the second quarter, according to the ÁKK’s accounts.

On top of these loans, Hungary also has CNY 3 billion worth of foreign currency bonds due for repayment to Chinese investors this year and next, which equates to around EUR 380 million at the current exchange rates. In total, 444 estimates Hungary’s debt to China now exceeds HUF 1,000 billion (EUR 2.536 billion), although they caution it could be even higher.

If anyone here is interested in a more technical interview, here are two socialists with doctorates in economics talk about why after two hundred years of talking about fixing the housing market haven’t gotten anywhere.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/1975503

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The most important part of the [International Monetary Fund] IMF’s latest assessment of China is—alas—the appendix on China’s new methodology for calculating China’s trade balance.

It at least explains why China’s balance of payments trade surplus diverges from China’s customs trade surplus, and why the gap started to explode around 2022 [...] China’s data doesn't agree with itself. One measure of the goods deficit is a lot bigger than another measure of the goods surplus.

[...]

You might think that a foreign firm producing in China for sale in China (“in China for China” is a thing) would not register in China’s trade data. After all, goods made in China and sold in China never cross a border, and thus should not show up in the customs data.

But in the new balance of payments data, China basically reports a trade deficit with itself because of foreign firms producing in China.

[...]

If a foreign firm contracts with a Chinese firm to manufacture that foreign firm’s goods in China, and then receives delivery of those goods in China, China counts this as an export.

[...]

But the strange turn happens if the foreign firm turns around and sells the good that a contract manufacturer produced for it inside China. Such goods are now being counted as an import in the balance of payments data.

Thus, China exports goods to foreign firms operating in China, and then imports those goods back from the same firm even though the goods never leave China. If the goods are sold at a higher price than the contract manufacturer receives, it ends up being reported as a trade deficit in the balance of payments.

[...]

So Chinese production for the Chinese market by foreign firms is somehow generating a trade deficit in the balance of payments data. This, of course, makes no real economic sense.

[...]

Bottom line: there is no good reason to think that this adjustment in captures anything important about how China’s economy interacts with the global economy. All this “fake” trade deficit does is reduce China’s reported current account surplus—as the goods surplus in the balance of payments is now about $300 billion (over 1.5 percentage points of China’s GDP) smaller than what it should be in the balance of payments data [while the author estimates] the current account surplus to be close to $700 billion even after the drop tied the resumption of tourism in 2023.

[...]

What matters for now is that a large number of analysts are using China's current account data to assess China's impact on the world without realizing that the fall in China's surplus since 2021 is basically an artifact of difficult to justify changes in China's balance of payments methodology. The real story is found in the old fashioned goods data.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/1752069

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While housing rescue policies may help provide stimulus to property markets, the economic fundamentals currently unfolding in China are unfavourable to their implementation, writes Yixiao Zhou from The Australian National University.

[...]

China has one of the world’s highest housing price-to-income ratios at 29.59. China also has a low lending interest rate at around 4 per cent. Considering this, the room for expanding the mortgage scale is limited, constraining the ability of easing lending rules to stimulate housing demand.

Another short-term demand factor is the transfer of rural homestead land. In June 2024, Nantong, a city in Jiangsu province, introduced new policies that allow individuals who voluntarily relinquish their rural homesteads and buy homes in urban areas to receive financial subsidies. Nantong is not alone in this initiative. Encouraging the voluntary and compensated relocation from rural homesteads has become a key focus of real estate policies. But this does not seem to have affected the decreasing trend of housing prices either.

[...]

If downward adjustment in property prices leads to real estate loan default, this will pose major risks to financial stability. Japan’s experience with a massive real estate bubble burst in the early 1990s provides a crucial lesson for policymakers in China. The sharp downturn in the real estate sector led to a prolonged period of economic stagnation known as ‘Japan’s lost decade’.

[...]

Ultimately the structural problems holding back demand for properties could be solved by reforms in land allocation, financial market regulation and urbanisation policies. These reforms could help reposition China’s property sector on a healthy and sustainable growth path.

Local government debt is estimated at up to $11 trillion, including what's owed by local government financing entities that are “off balance sheet,” or not included in official estimates. More than 300 reforms the party has outlined include promises to better monitor and manage local debt, one of the biggest risks in China’s financial system.

That will be easier said than done, and experts question how thoroughly the party will follow through on its pledges to improve the tax regime and better balance control of government revenues.

“They are not grappling with existing local debt problems, nor the constraints on fiscal capacity,” said Logan Wright of the Rhodium Group, an independent research firm. “Changing central and local revenue sharing and expenditure responsibilities is notable but they have promised this before.”

The scramble to collect long overdue taxes shows the urgency of the problems.

Chinese food and beverage conglomerate VV Food & Beverage reported in June it was hit with an 85 million yuan ($12 million) bill for taxes dating back as far as 30 years ago. Zangge Mining, based in western China, said it got two bills totaling 668 million RMB ($92 million) for taxes dating to 20 years earlier.

Local governments have long been squeezed for cash since the central government controls most tax revenue, allotting a limited amount to local governments that pay about 80% of expenditures such as salaries, social services and investments in infrastructure like roads and schools.

Pressures have been building as the economy slowed and costs piled up from “zero-COVID” policies during the pandemic.

US stocks plunged on Monday morning as Friday’s dismal July jobs report continued stoking fears that the US economy is on shaky legs.

The Dow plunged 1,072 points, or 2.7%. The S&P 500 fell 4.1% and the Nasdaq Composite sank by a whopping 6.3%.

The Cboe Volatility Index, or VIX, which measures bets on expected stock market volatility, surged to 55. The last time the fear gauge hit that level outside of the pandemic was the Great Financial Crisis, in 2008.

Video about job prospects after big tech layoffs

Tldr: healthcare, education, transportation, manufacturing is outpacing IT in hiring

As Pakistan works on enacting economic reforms under a multibillion-dollar IMF bailout, Islamabad must first figure out what to do with its mountain of debt owed to China

After cash-strapped Pakistan secured a new $7 billion (€6.5 billion) bailout package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in July, Islamabad has started talks with Beijing on reprofiling billions in Chinese debt as it seeks to enact economic reforms.

On the table are proposals to delay at least $16 billion in energy sector debt to China, along with extending the term of a $4 billion cash loan facility due to depleting foreign exchange reserves.

Last week, Pakistani Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb was in Beijing to present proposals on extending the maturity of debt for nine power plants built by Chinese companies under the multibillion-dollar Pakistan China Economic Corridor (CPEC).

On Friday, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif told a federal cabinet meeting that he had written a letter to the Chinese government requesting debt reprofiling, Pakistan's Dawn newspaper reported.

Reprofiling debt differs from restructuring debt in that the amount is not cut, rather, the due date for repayment is extended.

Islamabad is under immense pressure to renegotiate the expensive agreements with power producers, primarily Chinese companies, to bring down electricity prices.

Since CPEC was signed in 2015 and became one of largest components of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has poured billions of dollars into developing infrastructure in Pakistan.

The value of CPEC projects comes in a $65 billion, with the primary goal of building a shipping connection for Chinese goods from Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea over the mountain border into China's Xinjiang region.

Archived version

U.S. Sen. Elizabeth Warren on Friday demanded that the chairman of the Federal Reserve immediately "cancel his summer vacation" and slash interest rates following the release of government data showing weaker-than-expected job growth and an increase in the unemployment rate last month.

Warren (D-Mass.), an outspoken critic of the Fed's aggressive interest rate increases, argued in a social media post that Fed Chair Jerome Powell "made a serious mistake not cutting interest rates" at the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) meeting earlier this week. The central bank's policy-setting group opted to hold rates at 5.25% to 5.5% for the 12th consecutive month.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/1386306

Over the past 20 years, China has become the largest lender in the Pacific. Now Tonga, Vanuatu and Samoa are spending some of the biggest sums in the world to repay debts to China, as a proportion of their GDP, according to Lowy Institute analysis.

Pacific countries have some of the highest costs in the world in terms of climate adaptation needs, but these are things that have to be deprioritised to deal with the debt. "It's a trade-off and it's not one that's good," Tonga's finance minister says.

Experts say China's EXIM Bank does not forgive foreign debts. "It will ease borrowing terms by extending repayment moratoria or pushing out final loan repayment dates. However, it rarely reduces interest rates," Bradley Parks, executive director of AidData, said.

• Tonga's annual debt repayments to China are nearly 4 per cent of its GDP — the third-highest level in the world. It's a rate that Lowy research associate Riley Duke calls "astronomically high".

• AidData analysis has found 85 per cent of China's loan-financed infrastructure projects in Tonga show signs of debt distress.

• Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Cook Islands also have moderate levels of public debt exposure to China, according to the AidData research lab at William & Mary, a Virginia-based public university in the United States.

• Vanuatu has struggled less with its debts to China and has met its loan repayments, but a series of economic shocks have set the nation back, including three tropical cyclones in 2023 and the collapse of its national carrier in May.

• Loan repayments to China commonly drain resources from public services such as health and education, and other pressing needs in the region. In Tonga's case, the government was spending more on servicing its debt than on health.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/1212562

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In Laos, the tiny Asian country, China became the largest foreign investor with some $5 billion spread across 745 projects, overtaking Thailand. The China-led strategy was meant to protect countries like Laos from economic shocks — instead, it led to them. Today Laos is struggling to repay the billions it borrowed from China to fund the hydroelectric dams, trains and highways, which have drained the country of foreign reserves. As repayments drag, external debt is rising, a vulnerability exacerbated by the pandemic and rising global fuel and food prices.

The escalating public debt in Laos has sparked global discussions regarding the sustainability within the region. This concern primarily stems from China’s increasing role as a significant financier of Southeast Asian infrastructure projects, raising fears that China might be using debt to gain geopolitical leverage by ensnaring impoverished nations in unmanageable loan agreements.

When President Xi Jinping of China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in a pair of speeches in 2013, the initiative became popular in the developing world, where almost all countries face infrastructure deficiencies. Beijing has loaned almost $1 trillion to developing nations in the past two decades. But China was specifically providing debt and burdening borrowing countries with high-interest rates they could not repay.

[...]

BRI has also been criticised as an effort to export China’s authoritarian model, as a number of major loan recipients have poor records of democracy and civil liberties like in Cambodia and Laos in Asia.

What then results is called ‘Debt-trap diplomacy (DTD),’ now associated as a Chinese policy tool connected to BRI. The approach to Debt-trap diplomacy begins by China intentionally lending excessively money to low-income indebted states that cannot later repay Chinese debt. Loan taking nations see a rise in public debt. However, it is difficult to say how much Chinese financing is going to infrastructure in Southeast Asia because the Chinese effort lacks transparency. China’s loans are largely coming from the two policy banks: China Development Bank and China EXIM Bank. They borrow on domestic and international capital markets and lend with a spread, so they expect to be financially self-sufficient.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/865985

The fatalistic tag “garbage time” began popping up on social media platforms over the past month. It was given a more recent boost when state media and commentators lined up to denounce the phrase and any suggestion that decline would follow downturn for China.

“This is a catchphrase insinuating that there’s no help and no hope, denying and downplaying everything in China,” [state-owned media outlet] Beijing Daily said in a commentary last week.

It follows another buzzword China’s censors have targeted as a threat to stability since it broke into the mainstream three years ago: “lying flat,” a call to a slacker life of limited ambition and quiet protest.

[...]

There are other signs China’s collective confidence has suffered, according to survey data collected by Stanford University professor Scott Rozelle and others published in summary last week by the U.S. think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Rozelle found Chinese respondents to a survey were more pessimistic than they had been two decades ago, more likely to blame structural factors for determining whether a person is rich or poor and far less likely to believe hard work pays off.

In 2004, 62% agreed “in our country, effort is always rewarded." That dropped to 28% in the 2023 survey.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/860815

The Chinese banking sector is facing a severe crisis. In just one week, 40 banks disappeared, and the collapse of Jiangxi Bank has further deepened the sector's problems.

Cryptocurrency market analyst Sigma G also examined the situation in China's banking sector. He points out that the leading cause of the problems is the deep recession in China's real estate sector. Over-indebted developers and local governments fail to repay loans, leading to financial instability. Property prices have plummeted, and construction projects have been halted, further burdening the economic system.

The author also highlights the issue of hidden bad debts. Banks have used asset management companies (AMCs) to offload toxic loans, creating an illusion of stability. However, a new banking regulator, the National Financial Regulatory Administration (NAFR), has begun cracking down on these practices by imposing fines and increasing oversight.

Many Chinese cities and even entire regions are drowning in debt. The liabilities were so high that local government representatives sent envoys to Beijing in the spring. They are negotiating terms for repaying billions in loans. Unpaid debts are increasingly weighing on regional economies, threatening national economic growth.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/859855

Archived version

In 2025, Russia’s Central Bank plans to fully roll out the digital ruble — a new form of currency that, according to officials, can be used on par with cash and electronic payments, and holds the exact same value as the traditional ruble.

The Russian authorities insist that this new tool is safer than cash and that the fees for using it will be lower than for other electronic payment methods. Every digital ruble has its own unique code, which theoretically makes it possible for the Central Bank to restrict its use — and, according to experts from the digital rights group Roskomsvoboda, to monitor citizens’ transactions.

• The issuer of this new form of currency is the Central Bank itself, a key difference to conventional bank transfers. Responsibility for its use and management will fall on the state, not on commercial banks. When customers deposit funds into their digital ruble accounts, they will effectively be lending their money to the authorities.

• At the same time, commercial banks will be responsible for all account operations, as well as for ensuring security. Clients will be able to manage their digital rubles through commercial bank apps.

• Each digital ruble will always be worth exactly one ruble. However, it’s possible that the authorities will restrict how digital rubles can be spent; the Central Bank may encode certain rubles, for example, so that they can’t be used for gambling or buying alcohol.

• Unique codes on each digital ruble will allow the government to directly monitor citizens’ spending when they use the new form of currency.

• The digital ruble could become a major tool in the Central Bank’s management of Russia’s finances, allowing not only the monitoring of transactions (the government already surveils non-cash payments) but also “instantaneous and direct control over monetary policy.”

• According to the lawyer, the government could use it to instantly implement currency redenomination or impose broad restrictions on money use. “During the COVID restrictions, for example, it would have been possible to use digital rubles to ban payments for [travel] tickets and hotels,” the lawyer said.

Archived version

• Nepal has shied away from signing a plan to implement China’s ambitious Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) in the Himalayan nation. Resisting immense pressure from Beijing, Nepal’s Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal refused to greenlight the signing that would have paved the way for the implementation of nine mega and more than a dozen major BRI projects in Nepal.

• That’s because soon after Nepal signed the BRI framework agreement in May 2017, India launched a massive but silent campaign to educate and explain Nepal’s political leadership, economists, bureaucrats, diplomats, academia, media and civil society leaders the pitfalls of China’s BRI to them, making Nepal’s top politicians and others fully aware of China’s sinister plan to ensnare nations into a debt trap through the BRI.

• PM Deuba eventually told China that Nepal would only agree to a small component of the cost of BRI projects in the form of loans. However, the interest on such loans should not be more than what multilateral lending agencies like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) charge for their loans (one per cent per annum).

• This was not acceptable to China which charges more than two per cent on the loans it gives to other countries to finance BRI projects. Also, China insists on the contracts for these projects being awarded only to Chinese companies and refuses to do away with or water down penalty clauses (in case of failure to repay the loans on time).

What also worked against China was Nepal’s experience with the Pokhara International Airport which cost US $ 305 million. China’s Exim Bank provided a loan of about US $ 215 million at 2 per cent interest. Chinese firms were awarded contracts for construction and technical works.

Allegations of shoddy construction, inflated costs and mismanagement by the Chinese have fuelled public anger against China in Nepal. The airport has turned into a huge liability (read this) since no commercial and scheduled flights are operating from there.

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/374497

UniCredit said on Monday it was challenging the terms set by the European Central Bank (ECB) for the Italian bank to cut its exposure to Russia, and seeking a ruling from the European Union's General Court, as well as a freezing of the request in the meantime.

Euro zone banks still involved with Russia more than two years after Moscow invaded Ukraine have come under growing pressure in recent weeks from the bloc's supervisors, as well as U.S. authorities, over their ties to the country.

A complex regulatory backdrop, involving Western sanctions against Moscow and local laws in Russia where the Italian group runs a retail bank, meant it had to "seek clarity and certainty" on the actions it needed to take, UniCredit said in a statement two and a half years after Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine.

After Austria's Raiffeisen, UniCredit has the biggest exposure to Russia, where it runs a top 15 bank, among European lenders.

Raiffeisen has no plans to take legal action against the ECB over the request to reduce its Russia-related business, a spokesperson has said.

"For anyone who believes that Ukraine's fight against Russia is important for the security of Europe, the fact that UniCredit stayed in Russia, made profits, and is now suing the ECB over their attempts to get it to leave, this doesn't look good," said Nicolas Veron of Brussels think tank Bruegel.

Local governments in China have asked several companies to pay tax bills dating back as far as the 1990s, underscoring their need for funding given the uneven economic recovery and persistent housing slump.

A number of listed firms have said in exchange filings in recent months that they’ve gotten government demands to pay tens of millions in back taxes and warned investors this could impact their earnings.

V V Food & Beverage Co. said last week that a liquor-making unit was told to pay some 85 million yuan ($11.7 million) on income it “failed to disclose” for about 15 years starting in 1994. ChinaLin Securities Co., Ningbo Bohui Petrochemical Technology Co., Zangge Mining Co. and PKU HealthCare Corp. have issued similar statements.

China’s local governments are facing unprecedented pressure to expand revenues because economic growth is slowing and the contracting real estate market has sent income from land sales plunging. Their already elevated debt stockpile is limiting their ability to leverage up further, forcing the central government to borrow more and give them the funds.

The tax recovery is “likely due to the fiscal distress of local governments,” said Xing Zhaopeng, an analyst at Australia & New Zealand Banking Group. “I think they need some money to pay by quarter end” because regional authorities usually pay contractors of government projects then, he added.

Local governments booked less than 5.8 trillion yuan in revenues under the general public budget and the government-fund account, which include taxes and land sales income, in the first four months of the year. That figure was less than the more than 5.9 trillion yuan in the same period last year, according to data from the Finance Ministry.

Their spending also fell to just under 10 trillion yuan from 10.4 trillion yuan a year earlier.

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For over half a year, Russian companies have been facing difficulties in processing payments with China. Fearing secondary sanctions, banks are refusing to transfer funds, leaving importers unable to bring goods into the country. Vladimir Putin raised this issue during his visit to Beijing in May, but the situation doesn’t seem to have improved.

On December 22, 2023, U.S. President Joe Biden signed an executive order allowing sanctions to be imposed on banks from third countries if they are caught aiding the Russian military-industrial complex. Once blacklisted, these companies would be banned from holding correspondent accounts in American banks, meaning they’d be unable to conduct any dollar transactions. Following this order, dozens of Chinese financial organizations refused to accept transfers from Russia — not only in U.S. dollars but also in Chinese yuan.

On June 12 of this year, Washington tightened its demands. Previously, transactions involving five sectors of the Russian economy — technology, defense, construction, aerospace, and manufacturing — were under scrutiny. Now, the U.S. Treasury has expanded the definition of the military-industrial complex to include all companies previously sanctioned under Executive Order No. 14024. This means that the number of Russian entities that foreign banks must avoid to maintain access to dollar transactions has significantly increased. According to Castellum.AI, there are more than 4,000 such organizations.

Biden’s executive order — neither in its new nor old versions — has yet to be enforced against banks from third countries. So far, representatives of the U.S. administration have only issued verbal warnings: Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed “serious concern” about the supply of machines and microelectronics to Russia, and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen publicly mentioned the sanctions risk during her visit to China in early April.

This was enough to trigger significant shifts in trade between Russia and China. By the end of 2023, trade turnover had increased by 26 percent to a record $240 billion. However, in April 2024, China’s customs authority reported a 15 percent reduction in deliveries of cars, equipment, and other machinery. Bloomberg noted that exports to Russia fell for the first time in two years, linking this to sanctions risks. Chinese exports to Russia also fell in May, and Russian customs confirmed the continued decline of imports from Asia. Russia’s Central Bank acknowledged that it had become generally more difficult for Russian banks to open correspondent accounts abroad, even in “friendly” currencies, and directly linked this to “sanctions the United States adopted in December 2023.”

The issue was also discussed at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Industry players reported that money transfers from Russia to China could take as long as three months, and even then might end up being returned to the sender. Businesses complained that they couldn’t even pay for theater decorations or children’s displays. Pavel Brun, the head of MasterProf, said his company hasn’t been able to arrange the supply of plumbing fixtures. “It’s like walking through a minefield,” he told Business FM.

Finding a workaround

Some hopes were pinned on Vladimir Putin’s mid-May visit to China. However, although Putin mentioned that the payment issue was discussed, he didn’t provide any specifics, and business owners confirmed that the difficulties in making payments persisted even after the delegation returned to Moscow.

A source in the trade industry told Reuters that the typical way Russian businessmen solve this problem is by going “from bank to bank, opening current accounts.” “If their payment doesn’t go through, they go to the next one,” the source explained. In response, Chinese financial institutions have started imposing additional requirements, such as asking for an office lease agreement in the province where the bank is located. “While this would have seemed like a harsh requirement before, we have no choice now,” business owners commented to Kommersant FM.

One of the most promising options was to open an account at the Chinese branch of the Russian bank VTB. The demand for this was so high that businesses were often left waiting as long as a year to open an account. VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin promised to more than double the staff to speed up this service. However, in its broadened interpretation of Russia’s military-industrial complex, the U.S. Treasury directly named VTB as one of the banned entities for transactions. This will likely complicate the bank’s operations.

As an alternative, businesses have started using banks in third countries as intermediaries, sending money through companies in Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the U.A.E., and other “friendly” jurisdictions, rather than directly from Russia, according to Reuters sources. This scheme can prove costly: intermediaries may charge a commission of several thousand dollars per transaction, they don’t guarantee success, and the sender will have trouble getting the money back if the payment fails. Goods may also be confiscated in the intermediary countries. Nevertheless, half of the payments are currently processed this way.

Some companies have started using cryptocurrency to make payments to China, specifically the stablecoin Tether, which is pegged to the U.S. dollar, reports Bloomberg. Instead of waiting months, payments are processed in 5-15 seconds, and without the hefty commissions intermediaries charge. However, there are risks for Chinese partners: since 2021, the local regulator has deemed all cryptocurrency transactions illegal. To circumvent these issues, an even more unorthodox solution has been devised: Russian steel companies are now bartering metal for any goods that Chinese businesses are willing to offer. This way, no cross-border financial transactions are needed at all. Both Russian customs and the Industry and Trade Ministry have noted the growing popularity of this bartering system.

If businesses still need to make monetary payments, they often turn to small rural banks in northeastern China. According to Reuters, these banks, located along the Russian border, are willing to accept transfers and have less stringent compliance requirements. However, due to high demand, even these banks have waiting lists to open an account that stretch for several months.

The System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) — Russia’s SWIFT analogue for domestic and international transactions — could potentially help. However, VTB has complained that too few foreign companies are currently connected to it. Additionally, the system was developed by the Central Bank, which deters non-residents from using it due to sanctions risks. And with good reason: Bloomberg pointed out that the E.U. and the G7 could jointly impose sanctions for connecting to the system.

Ripple effects

Paradoxically, the current payment issues are having a positive impact on the Russian economy. The inability to transfer money has hit imports, thereby reducing the demand for foreign currency. This supports the ruble exchange rate, as noted in the Central Bank in official reports. The bank doesn’t believe this factor will have a significant impact on GDP.

However, as Sofia Donets, the chief economist at Tinkoff Investments, told RBC, these problems will ultimately lead to additional costs for sellers. The Moscow-based investment company Tsifra Broker concurs that prices for many goods could rise if timely shipments can’t be ensured. Categories making up the largest share of Chinese exports to Russia are at risk: equipment, land transport vehicles, electrical machinery, and electrical equipment.

Currently, importers are complaining that fraudsters are trying to exploit the situation: they write to Russian entrepreneurs posing as Chinese partners and notify them of a change in banking details. There’s been at least one known case where a business ended up sending money to an account, only to find that they couldn’t reach the sender afterward and were left without the paid-for goods.

Some market participants believe that resolving the payment crisis will depend on how much banks can earn from conducting such operations. For instance, Anatoly Semenov, director of the Parallel Import Association, points out that so long as the markets of countries unfriendly to Russia are of interest to Chinese businesses, they won’t openly violate the sanctions regime and risk their investments. Banks in Turkey and the U.A.E. are also refusing transactions with Russia. Against this backdrop, The Bell estimates that imports from some countries have dropped by a third this year.