eager_eagle

Moot point. Librewolf won't exist without Firefox.

XDG doesn't apply for CLI apps? About half of dirs I still have cluttering my home are GUI apps whose devs refuse to follow the specification, while I see less friction from CLI/TUI devs, since they're the ones actually seeing these hidden locations.

The spec doesn't make those assumptions at all, idk where that's coming from.

I have headless machines with XDG vars configured and ones without them. XDG compliant software works in either case, but I'm less likely to use a piece of software that clutters my $HOME.

off the shelf go was too annoying for me

Nowadays I set GOENV_ROOT to an XDG location and use goenv instead.

and later the turbo button on your pc that actually made the CPU clock slower

turbon't

it's like a drizzle is a dryer alternative to a thunderstorm

surely I'd prefer none, but if I had to choose...

I see this as them giving companies a more privacy-preserving alternative to tracking. And just another privacy setting to opt out for us.

Instead of a reactive social media post, here's how it works.

The only real alternative to this conflict of interest between companies and customers is an independent browser.

lol they barely changed anything visually

Recall is also not supposed to collect data from private sessions from popular web browsers.

it makes one wonder how well that works; if it's based on OCR, does it "redact" the bounding box corresponding to the private window? What happens with overlapping windows; how does it handle windows with transparency; I can't help to think there's a high probability their solution is flaky.

Full disk encryption is not a solution here. Any application that’s already running which can provide read only file system access to an attacker is not going to be affected by your full disk encryption.

that's my point

upon reading a bit how different wallets work, it seems macos is able to identify the program requesting the keychain access when it's signed with a certificate - idk if that's the case for signal desktop on mac, and I don't know what happens if the program is not signed.

As for gnome-keyring, they ackowledge that doing it on Linux distros this is a much larger endeavor due to the attack surface:

An active attack is where the attacker can change something in your security context. In the context of gnome-keyring an active attacker would have access to your user session in some way. An active attacker might install an application on your computer, display a window, listen into the X events going to another window, read through your memory, snoop on you from a root account etc.

While it'd be nice for gnome-keyring to someday be hardened against active attacks originating from the user's session, the reality is that the free software "desktop" today just isn't architected with those things in mind. We need completion and integration things like the following. Kudos to the great folks working on parts of this stuff:

- Trusted X (for prompting)
- Pervasive use of security contexts for different apps (SELinux, AppArmor)
- Application signing (for ACLs) 

We're not against the goal of protecting against active attacks, but without hardening of the desktop in general, such efforts amount to security theater.

Also

An example of security theater is giving the illusion that somehow one application running in a security context (such as your user session) can keep information from another application running in the same security context.

In other words, the problem is beyond the scope of gnome-keyring. Maybe now with diffusion of Wayland and more sandboxing options reducing this context becomes viable.

let me just highlight that if someone has access only to your signal desktop conversations, they have access to your signal desktop conversations.

if someone has access to your windows recall db, they have access to your signal desktop conversations, the pages you've browsed including in private windows, documents you've written, games you've played, social media posts you've seen, and pretty much anything you've done using that machine.

perhaps that does demand a slightly different level of concern.