July 2, 2024
Sylvain Kerkour writes:
Rust adoption is stagnating not because it's missing some feature pushed by programming language theory enthusiasts, but because of a lack of focus on solving the practical problems that developers are facing every day.
... no company outside of AWS is making SDKs for Rust ... it has no official HTTP library.
As a result of Rust's lack of official packages, even its core infrastructure components need to import hundreds of third-party crates.
...the offical libsignal (from the Signal messaging app) uses 500 third-party packages.
... what is really inside these packages. It has been found last month that among the 999 most popular packages on crates.io, the content of around 20% of these doesn't even match the content of their Git repository.
...how I would do it (there may be better ways):
A stdx (for std eXtended) under the rust-lang organization containing the most-needed packages. ... to make it secure: all packages in stdx can only import packages from std or stdx. No third-party imports. No supply-chain risks.
[stdx packages to include, among others]:
gzip, hex, http, json, net, rand
Read Rust has a HUGE supply chain security problem
Submitter's note:
I find the author's writing style immature, sensationalist, and tiresome, but they raise a number of what appear to be solid points, some of which are highlighted above.
Exactly. A "supply-chain attack" is a very real thing in software, and it doesn't really matter whether you consider yourself a supplier, the fact remains that something a product relies on had a security vulnerability that resulted in the product getting pwned. Nobody should be claiming that the unpaid developer maintaining that library that resulted in the vulnerability is somehow at fault in any legal sense because the license specifically states there is no warranty etc, but it is useful to point to that library as having that vulnerability to let other organizations know where the problem originated so they can either fix or replace it.