Security

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Confidentiality Integrity Availability

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There’s a server, a client, and a hacker in a network. For encryption, the client and the server need to share their private keys. Wouldn’t the hacker be able to grab those during their transmission and decrypt further messages as they please?

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cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/11554206

Researchers have found two novel types of attacks that target the conditional branch predictor found in high-end Intel processors, which could be exploited to compromise billions of processors currently in use.

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cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/11143989

Fresh Social Engineering Attacks Resemble Tactics Used Against XZ Utils MaintainerMajor open-source software projects are warning that more pieces of code than XZ Utils may have been backdoored by attackers, based on ongoing supply-chain attack attempts that have targeted "popular JavaScript projects," apparently seeking to trick them into sharing code maintainer rights.

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submitted 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) by lemmyreader@lemmy.ml to c/security@lemmy.ml
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cross-posted from: https://infosec.pub/post/10912691

Researchers have demonstrated the "first native Spectre v2 exploit" for a new speculative execution side-channel flaw that impacts Linux systems running on many modern Intel processors. [...]

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The XZ Utils backdoor, discovered last week, and the Heartbleed security vulnerability ten years ago, share the same ultimate root cause. Both of them, and in fact all critical infrastructure open source projects, should be fixed with the same solution: ensure baseline funding for proper open source maintenance.

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Spain's High Court has ordered the suspension of messaging app Telegram's services in the country after media companies complained it was allowing users to upload their content without permission, according to a court source.

The use of Telegram in Spain will be temporarily suspended from Monday after a request by media firms including Atresmedia (A3M.MC), opens new tab, EGEDA, Mediaset (GETVF.PK), opens new tab and Telefonica (TEF.MC), opens new tab.

Judge Santiago Pedraz agreed to block Telegram's services in Spain while the claims are investigated. It will be the responsibility of mobile phone providers to block Telegram's services, the court source said.

Telegram is the fourth most-used messaging service in Spain, according to competition watchdog CNMC. It was used by nearly 19% of Spaniards surveyed by CNMC.

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Today, almost everything about our lives is digitally recorded and stored somewhere. Each credit card purchase, personal medical diagnosis, and preference about music and books is recorded and then used to predict what we like and dislike, and—ultimately—who we are.

This often happens without our knowledge or consent. Personal information that corporations collect from our online behaviors sells for astonishing profits and incentivizes online actors to collect as much as possible. Every mouse click and screen swipe can be tracked and then sold to ad-tech companies and the data brokers that service them.

In an attempt to justify this pervasive surveillance ecosystem, corporations often claim to de-identify our data. This supposedly removes all personal information (such as a person’s name) from the data point (such as the fact that an unnamed person bought a particular medicine at a particular time and place). Personal data can also be aggregated, whereby data about multiple people is combined with the intention of removing personal identifying information and thereby protecting user privacy.

Sometimes companies say our personal data is “anonymized,” implying a one-way ratchet where it can never be dis-aggregated and re-identified. But this is not possible—anonymous data rarely stays this way. As Professor Matt Blaze, an expert in the field of cryptography and data privacy, succinctly summarized: “something that seems anonymous, more often than not, is not anonymous, even if it’s designed with the best intentions.”

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In its 10 years of operation, Grindr had amassed millions of users and become a central cog in gay culture around the globe.

But to Yeagley, Grindr was something else: one of the tens of thousands of carelessly designed mobile phone apps that leaked massive amounts of data into the opaque world of online advertisers. That data, Yeagley knew, was easily accessible by anyone with a little technical know-how. So Yeagley—a technology consultant then in his late forties who had worked in and around government projects nearly his entire career—made a PowerPoint presentation and went out to demonstrate precisely how that data was a serious national security risk.

As he would explain in a succession of bland government conference rooms, Yeagley was able to access the geolocation data on Grindr users through a hidden but ubiquitous entry point: the digital advertising exchanges that serve up the little digital banner ads along the top of Grindr and nearly every other ad-supported mobile app and website. This was possible because of the way online ad space is sold, through near-instantaneous auctions in a process called real-time bidding. Those auctions were rife with surveillance potential. You know that ad that seems to follow you around the internet? It’s tracking you in more ways than one. In some cases, it’s making your precise location available in near-real time to both advertisers and people like Mike Yeagley, who specialized in obtaining unique data sets for government agencies.

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