cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/16030383

All Santander staff and '30 million' customers in Spain, Chile and Uruguay hacked

France has banned Israeli companies from participating in this year’s annual Eurosatory arms and defence industry exhibition in Villepinte near Paris next month, the event’s organisers and the French Defence Ministry said on Friday, Reuters reports.

“Following a decision by government authorities, there will not be an Israeli stand at the Eurosatory 2024 salon,” a spokesperson for the organisers said via email.

The Defence Ministry told Reuters that: “Conditions are no longer met to host Israeli companies at the show at a time when the President is calling for Israel to cease operations in Rafah.”

Here is the study in English (pdf). There is a Hungarian version on website.

If you seek some orientation which political parties belong to which group in the EP, you may find this link to the European Parliament helpful.

Although most delegations from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are highly critical of the Kremlin, China and other authoritarian countries in the European Parliament, there are significant differences among them, a new study published by Political Capital reveals.

The Hungarian institute teamed up with partners to track the views of incumbent MEPs from the Visegrad countries, Austria, Bulgaria and Romania on authoritarian regimes.

While the Polish and Czech mainstream parties are staunch critics of authoritarians in the international and domestic arena, other mainstream parties from Austria, Bulgaria, and Romania are not as committed at home. Some populist radical and far-right parties seem to be close friends of authoritarians. Some parties such as Hungary’s Fidesz, Slovakia’s SMER-SD and Bulgaria’s BSP can be considered “soft defenders”. These parties engage in discourse similar to the far right, but intentionally abstain from voting due to political and reputational risks.--

As the European Parliament’s ninth term (2019-2024) is drawing a close, we can say that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have faced unprecedented challenges from Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and reacted to an increasingly assertive China that is now threatening Taiwan openly. While the European Parliament (EP) has no real decision-making power in the field of foreign policy, the interferences of authoritarian states show that their word still matters on the world stage. The alleged cash-for-influence Qatargate scandal, the biggest corruption instance to hit the EU in decades, showcased that authoritarian states are willing to spend resources on buying influence in the Parliament and its committees. Consequently, there is ever-growing value in studying the foreign policy-related votes in the EP.

Although the EP is not able to shape the EU’s foreign policy by itself, it can exert influence over it through its resolutions. Our previous study demonstrated that the MEPs have achieved substantive results in influencing the Union’s foreign policy decisions, such as voting to freeze the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement and approving the Ukraine Facility to help fund Ukraine in its struggle against Russia. The EP can exert more significant influence through the co-decision procedure as its consent or approval is necessary for issues like new EU Member State accession and international trade deals. The incoming MEPs in the next EU Parliament can be at least as influential in shaping the EU’s policies towards third countries as their predecessors were if the critics of authoritarian regimes maintain their substantial majority. Our analysis examines which parties consistently criticize authoritarian countries in the EP, from Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.

Big Picture: Party groups’ attitudes towards the Kremlin, China and other authoritarians

Bulwark against authoritarianism

The majority of MEPs from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are highly critical of the Kremlin, China, and other authoritarian regimes. This CEE “bulwark” against authoritarian countries varies between countries; the mainstream parties from Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Poland and Romania, as well as opposition parties from Hungary and Slovakia, are the toughest on authoritarianism. However, the authoritarian-critical voting stances may reflect concerns with social desirability within the European arena (as well as the convictions of individual MEPs). In Austria, Bulgaria and Romania, domestic party-political stances have pointed to more equivocal dispositions towards authoritarian regimes over time due to geopolitical positions and political and economic goals.

The Czech and Polish mainstream parties are the regional strongholds against authoritarian states. The Polish society and the whole political class share deep-rooted anti-Kremlin sentiment that transpires into the Polish MEPs' behavior in the EP. None of the Polish MEPs voted against any of the Russia-related votes. The ruling coalition parties and the Law and Justice (PiS, ECR) also united against Beijing due to widespread anti-communist and pro-American sentiments. Similarly, the Czech ruling coalition parties and the largest opposition party, ANO (RE), are jointly committed to critical stances towards authoritarianism. Czech MEPs continue to follow the value-based tradition of Vaclav Havel's diplomacy, which underscores the protection of human rights. At the same time, ANO has diverged from this strong Kremlin critical behavior and willfully spread anti-Ukrainian narratives at home. While Czech politicians show signs of pragmatism in relations with China, they do not shy away from condemning the country for its human rights violations in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Xinjiang, underlying that human rights are pre-conditions for engaging in trade and investment.

Although Austrian, Bulgarian and Romanian parties tend to support resolutions against the Kremlin, China, and other authoritarian countries in the EP their domestic representatives are not as committed to a staunch critical stance. There is a substantial disparity between domestic and international discourse. While the MEPs of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP, EPP) condemn authoritarians along with the rest of the mainstream parties in the EP (Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ, S&D), Greens (Greens/EFA), and the New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS, RE)), the ÖVP-led government engaged in a more pragmatic discourse at home and even blocked Kremlin critical initiatives within the EU institutions. Similarly, Romanian MEPs are more in with the open criticism of Moscow and Beijing than domestic representatives. Likewise, the conservative Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB, EPP) and the liberal Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS, RE) consistent alignment with critical attitudes towards Russia and China in the EP may be hollow. GERB’s and MRF’s strict adherence to critical resolutions on the surface may hide their deep-seated attitudes and behaviors favorable to Russian and Chinese interests.

Opposition parties from Slovakia and Hungary generally support resolutions that condemn the policies of authoritarian states. The Slovak MEPs from center and center-right parties (Progressive Slovakia (PS, RE), Christian Democratic Movement (KDH, EPP)Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO, EPP), Freedom and Solidarity (SaS, ECR), Democrats (former Spolu-OD, RE) have sharply critical attitudes towards authoritarian regimes. While Hungarian opposition MEPs (Democratic Coalition (DK, S&D), Momentum (RE), Jobbik-Conservatives, Independent) show resistance to authoritarianism, they miss numerous votes compared to Western parties. One notable figure here is István Ujhelyi, who missed 73% of the votes concerning China, likely exhibiting a “soft defense” strategy towards China. The DK and the Jobbik-Conservatives have become critical of Russia in the past few years as these parties used to have close ties with the Kremlin: DK leader Ferenc Gyurcsány pursued a very pro-Russian foreign policy line as prime minister before 2009, while the then-extremist Jobbik party promoted the Kremlin’s policy goals and legitimized the Russian regime before the party’s mainstream turn starting around 2016.

Friends of authoritarians

There are some parties from the CEE that seem to be lenient towards authoritarians. These are mostly extremist fringe parties such as the Freedom and Direct Party (SPD, ID), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM, The Left) from Czechia, and the Slovak Republic Movement (Republika, Independent) and the Slovak Patriot (Independent). The only exception is the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ, ID), which has been leading the polls in Austria. These parties can be deemed as the main entry points for authoritarian regimes to influence EP resolutions, although their aggregated weight is too low for any chance of success.

The FPÖ has cultivated a notoriously friendly relationship with the Kremlin and even signed a “friendship” agreement with the Russian ruling party, United Russia, in 2016. The FPÖ MEPs failed to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in key votes and statements. For instance, they voted against establishing the Ukraine Facility. The party also questioned the EU sanctions levied on Russia and called for a referendum on the matter in Austria. The leader of the FPÖ delegation, MEP Harald Vilimsky, stressed that a “small clique of EU-centralists is endangering our prosperity and freedom” with these sanctions.

Soft defenders of China and Russia

Some parties are "soft defenders" of Russia and other authoritarian regimes. We can call the strategy of the Hungarian right-wing Fidesz (Independent), the left-wing Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP, S&D) and Direction – Slovak Social Democracy (Smer-SD, Independent) on foreign policy votes as "soft defense"; meaning that frequently, these parties seem to miss votes deliberately to avoid having to condemn authoritarian regimes. Notably, the parties’ representatives engage in a discourse similar to that of far-right parties such as the FPÖ, while withdrawing from the voting process, presumably out of concern for the geopolitical risks and reputational costs of openly supporting Russia and China.

The Fidesz MEPs seem to intentionally abstain from voting, which condemns countries that are friendly to the Hungarian government. They missed more votes on issues relevant to Russia than the number of Kremlin-critical votes they cast. They voted critically on Russia 194 times altogether but failed to cast any vote 220 times. After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the MEPs abstained more often and even started to vote against resolutions condemning the Kremlin. Alarmingly, they failed to vote on a resolution condemning Russia for its unprovoked, unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as Belarus' alliance with Russia, on the occasion of the anniversary of the invasion. As a consequence of this strategy, Fidesz falls between the attitude of ECR and ID concerning Russia and China. Depending on whether Fidesz ends up in ID or ECR after the 2024 EP election determines whether the party openly becomes a friend of authoritarians or engages in a slightly more critical stance.

Like Fidesz, a distinctive pattern emerges in BSP MEPs' voting behavior: the non-participation or abstention from voting on resolutions that condemn authoritarian states' actions. The BSP MEPs voted against Russia-related resolutions 15 times, abstained 16 times and failed to cast any vote 111 times. Consequently, the MEPs can conceal and subdue their Russia-friendly stances via non-voting while supporting a few resolutions that condemn the most outrageous Russian interferences. While they supported the resolution on Russian aggression on Ukraine in 2022, they abstained from voting on the resolution that marked one year of Russia's war against Ukraine. Although BSP MEPs showed a tougher stance against China, they did not participate in Beijing's critical resolutions 40 times and abstained 10 times. The party's behaviour calls into question the extent to which the BSP – the formal successor to the Bulgarian Communist Party- integrated pro-Western and democratic values. The party continues to be divided between pro-Russian traditionalist-nationalist and pro-European fractions.

Although Smer-SD MEPs showed a more critical attitude towards authoritarianism than Fidesz and BSP, they frequently abstained in relevant votes and voted against pro-democratic resolutions. In October 2023, the party’s membership was suspended in the S&D group due to SMER-SD MEPs coalescing with the radical right. Smer-SD MEPs voted against the Report on the direction of EU-Russia political relations that strongly criticised Russia. The MEPs portray Russia as a reliable international partner and a friendly state in key debates. Growing threat in the next term

The CEE bulwark against authoritarianism may weaken in the EP after the upcoming 2024 elections. Extremist parties like the FPÖ stand to gain more EP seats, while new far-right and pro-Kremlin ones, such as the Hungarian Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) and the Bulgarian Revival (Vazrazhdane), are likely to join the Parliament. Along with the deterioration of the mainstream parties, these far-right parties will certainly erode the EP’s resolve against authoritarian regimes, as there will be more entry points for authoritarian countries to influence the decision-making. However, it remains unlikely that these parties will be able to turn the EP into a dovish body from its current hawkish foreign policy approach.

Additionally, there should be cause for alarm in the Council of the EU. Fidesz, Smer-SD, BSP and, to a lesser extent, ÖVP seem to be very lenient toward authoritarian countries. Fidesz, Smer-SD and ÖVP are the ruling parties in their respective countries. Thus, the Kremlin’s, China’s or other malign regimes’ interference can be reflected in EU policies via these parties through their work in the Council. Meanwhile, BSP remains the main opposition party in Bulgaria.

Deputy U.S. Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo said on Friday that Washington and the European Union must deliver a message to China that its firms face a choice between doing business with U.S. and EU economies or equipping Russia with dual-use goods.

It had to be made clear that "Chinese firms can either do business in our economies or they can equip Russia's war machinery with dual-use goods. They can't continue to do both," he said in a speech on a visit to Berlin.

Adeyemo said every country in the coalition that imposed sanctions over Russia's invasion of Ukraine and every country in NATO must communicate to Beijing that it is unacceptable for China to abet Russia's military-industrial base. "Let's make clear to Chinese companies that we are all prepared to use our sanctions and export controls to hold them accountable," he said.

President Joe Biden's administration has stepped up messaging about China's support for Russia and issued an executive order in December that threatened sanctions on financial institutions helping Moscow skirt Western sanctions.

Russia last year imported $5.2 billion worth of sensitive, dual-use goods - which can be used for both civil and military purposes - from China-based suppliers, Adeyemo said, marking an increase of more than 40%.

President Vladimir Putin has the capacity to prop up Russia's war economy for years, he said.

"No other country, despite what China would tell us, has the capacity to supply Russia with the quantity of machine tools, microelectronics, engine parts and other goods the Kremlin needs to build its weapons of choice," he said.

"Beijing may not be sending tanks and missiles to Russia but the Kremlin cannot produce these weapons at scale or continue its war without assistance from companies and financial institutions in China."

Adeyemo warned that failing to convince China to stop selling dual-use goods to Russia poses a significant threat to Europe's national security, adding that Putin was confident that he could challenge NATO.

Many of the goods from coalition countries still being found in Russian military equipment are largely being transhipped through China, he said.

Adeyemo's warning comes after U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell on Wednesday accused China's leadership of supporting Russia's war in Ukraine and warned that Beijing could face further sanctions in response.

On Tuesday, White House Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economics Daleep Singh said the U.S. and its partners were prepared to use sanctions and export controls to prevent China-Russia trade that threatens their security.

Case for Russian asset seizure

At a Q&A in Berlin, Adeyemo was asked about Raiffeisen Bank, which has come under heavy criticism as the largest Western lender still operating in Russia.

Without mentioning the Austrian bank by name, Adeyemo said the vast majority of banks were complying with the sanctions on Moscow and that, in the few cases where there were concerns, they were being addressed directly with the banks.

He also hoped that a leaders' summit of the Group of Seven (G7) wealthy industrialised nations in Italy next month would provide political direction on how best to use billions of dollars' worth of frozen Russian assets.

"We think there is a case for seizure. There are some who didn't think that that was the best way to go," he said, adding that countries were starting to make progress on which options to take.

"And it will send a clear message to Russia that they can't outlast us, that ultimately, we are committed to economically supporting Ukraine both through our countries, but also using our ability to unlock the value of these frozen assets in some way to continue to support the Ukrainian people as well."

The UK's Labour Party deselected Faiza Shaheen as a candidate for the marginal London seat of Chingford and Woodford Green over a series of social media posts which expressed support for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS), praised former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, and backed candidates running for the Green Party, among other issues, Middle East Eye has been told.

According to the earliest post, a now-deleted tweet from 25 March 2014, Shaheen liked an announcement from environmental economist Griffin Carpenter that he was deciding to stand as a Green Party candidate for Hackney Council.

A second was from 3 August 2014, during Israel's six-week war on the Gaza Strip, where an X user calling himself Rod Dixon shared a message in support of boycotting Israeli goods, and argued that the tactic worked against apartheid South Africa.

One of the more recent posts she liked, and which was flagged by the NEC, was from 12 May 2024, where Philip Lemoine, a PhD candidate and writer at the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology (CSPI), said: "Every time you say something even mildly critical of Israel, you're immediately assailed by scores of hysterical people who explain to you why you're completely wrong, how you’re biased against Israel.

Archived link

On 21 May, a St. Petersburg court sentenced 77-year-old scientist Anatoly Maslov to 14 years in prison for treason. A leading global specialist on hypersonic physics with an illustrious career, Maslov had already spent two years in an FSB isolation unit while prosecutors prepared the case against him for allegedly sharing details of Russia’s hypersonic weapons programme with a foreign government. Maslov has always maintained that the charges against him are baseless. Should he live to see the end of his sentence he will be 90 years old.

Several of Maslov’s colleagues at Novosibirsk’s Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics have also been arrested. In 2021, the FSB detained 73-year-old scientist Alexander Kuranov for sharing state secrets with foreign intelligence services at a Russian-American research symposium in St. Petersburg. Kuranov admitted guilt, was sentenced to seven years in a maximum-security penal colony, and is believed to have testified against Maslov.

In 2022, 56-year-old Alexander Shiplyuk was detained and transferred to a detention facility in Moscow for allegedly sharing classified hypersonic research at a conference in China, while Valery Zvegintsev, a 79-year-old hypersonic aerodynamic specialist, was detained by the FSB and placed under house arrest in 2023 for an article he wrote for an Iranian science journal. Both are currently awaiting trial.--

The summer of 2022 saw three leading Russian scientists arrested one after the other. Perhaps the most dramatic case was that of Dmitry Kolker, a laser physicist who was arrested while battling stage four pancreatic cancer in hospital. Forcibly removed from his bed and flown to Moscow’s notorious Lefortovo Prison, Kolker died two days later.

Maslov himself was detained that July in the city of Novosibirsk, where he worked as chief researcher at the Khristianovich Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, part of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Maslov’s research focus was gas dynamics, and his discoveries were instrumental in the development of hypersonic weapons — weapons which travel many times faster than the speed of sound.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) said it had reason to believe that Maslov had passed secret hypersonic weapons research to German intelligence in 2014. While very little is known about the case, it appears that the FSB found out about the alleged transfer of classified documents eight years after it occurred. Due to the state secrets involved, his trial was conducted behind closed doors.

State prosecutors requested Maslov be given a 17-year sentence in a high-security prison colony, something Maslov’s defence team baulked at, given that the 77-year-old had already suffered a heart attack during his two-year stint in pretrial detention, and argued that their client would be unable to serve a sentence of even half that duration.

Given Vladimir Putin’s pride that Russia’s hypersonic weapons are currently the best in the world, it’s perhaps unsurprising that researchers working in the field have borne the brunt of his paranoia.

Maslov’s defence lawyer argued a crime could not possibly have taken place, as even if Maslov had passed on the information he was charged with sharing, it wasn’t classified — a fact the FSB appears simply to have ignored. In a prepared statement, Maslov stressed that he had dedicated his entire life to his family and to the national science programme and categorically denied any wrongdoing.

Yevgeny Smirnov, a lawyer for First Department, a legal advocacy group that specialises in closed trials, described the sentence as part of the “trend towards harsher punishments” in the Russian judicial system since the war in Ukraine began. He said that the 14 years Maslov had received was “perhaps a record” for a sentence given to a scientist and added that “the worsening trend in cases brought against scientists accused of treason is in line with the general trend for anyone charged with threatening national security”.

Asked about Maslov’s chances of surviving a prison sentence of such a length, Smirnov struck a surprisingly practical tone. “In this case, you know, everything depends very much on the person, on the support they receive, and on the penal colony they end up in. I don’t know where Maslov will serve his sentence; he will only be transferred after his appeal,” Smirnov continued. “But again, he’s 77 years old, and he has spent two years behind bars. According to his lawyers, his health has deteriorated during that time. And a sentence of 14 years, I’m afraid, may become a life sentence, just taking into account average life expectancy in Russia and the medicine available to prisoners.”

While Smirnov acknowledged that Maslov’s case had gone on for so long because the defence team hadn’t given up hope, he also said that treason charges were very rarely overturned.

But Maslov is not the only scientist in his field to have been prosecuted. Eleven Russian specialists in hypersonic technology have been convicted of treason since 2015. Given Vladimir Putin’s pride that Russia’s hypersonic weapons are currently the best in the world, it’s perhaps unsurprising that researchers working in the field — three of whom have died while awaiting trial — have borne the brunt of his paranoia.

Indeed, several of the Russian hypersonic researchers responsible for the country’s global preeminence in the field are now languishing in prison or are awaiting their fate in pretrial detention. Many were involved in Transhyberian, an officially sanctioned collaborative research project with the EU, according to scientific journal T-Invariant.

“We are not only afraid for the fate of our colleagues. We simply don’t know how to continue doing our job.”

Moscow State Technical University professor, Vladimir Lapygin, 74, was the first to be arrested and charged with passing state secrets to China. Though Lapygin insisted he was innocent, he was found guilty and sentenced to seven years in a high-security penal colony in 2016, and was recognised as a political prisoner by Russian human rights organisation Memorial, which described him as a victim of “spy-mania designed to support the image of ‘a Russia encircled by enemies’ created by state propaganda”.

In 2018, 75-year-old scientist Viktor Kudryavtsev was arrested for allegedly passing classified information to the Belgian Von Karman Institute for Fluid Dynamics, where the Transhyberian project was based. A year later, the FSB arrested Roman Kovalyov, also for allegedly passing classified Russian hypersonic research to the Von Karman Institute. While Kudryavtsev maintained his innocence, Kovalyov pleaded guilty and testified against Kudryavtsev after allegedly being pressured by FSB investigator Alexander Chaban. However, in a tragic turn, the two scientists were subsequently diagnosed with cancer and both died shortly after being released for treatment.

In 2020, scientist Anatoly Gubanov was imprisoned for allegedly sharing reports containing Russian state secrets to his supervisor on another international hypersonics project HEXAFLY-INT. According to his lawyer, Gubanov was subjected to intense psychological pressure by investigators in the run up to his admission of guilt and his eventual decision to make a plea deal.

Six months after Gubanov’s arrest, it was the turn of Russia’s leading hypersonic aircraft specialist Valery Golubkin to be prosecuted. The charges he faced also related to HEXAFLY-INT, though Golubkin maintained his innocence and was sentenced to 12 years in a maximum security penal colony, where he is currently awaiting his appeal hearing. In an unexpected turn of events, however, Gubanov ultimately broke the terms of his deal and refused to give evidence against Golubkin in court, meaning that he too was then sentenced to 12 years in a high-security penal colony.

In 2021, the FSB detained 73-year-old scientist Alexander Kuranov for sharing state secrets with foreign intelligence services at a Russian-American research symposium in St. Petersburg. Kuranov admitted guilt, was sentenced to seven years in a maximum-security penal colony, and is believed to have testified against Maslov.

And still the arrests continue. In December, Vladislav Galkin, an associate professor on hypersonic technologies at Tomsk Polytechnic University was detained in Novosibirsk and is currently awaiting trial.

Several more of Maslov’s erstwhile colleagues at Novosibirsk’s Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics have also been arrested. In 2022, 56-year-old Alexander Shiplyuk was detained and transferred to a detention facility in Moscow for allegedly sharing classified hypersonic research at a conference in China, while Valery Zvegintsev, a 79-year-old hypersonic aerodynamic specialist, was detained by the FSB and placed under house arrest in 2023 for an article he wrote for an Iranian science journal. Both are currently awaiting trial.

In 2023, after yet another arrest, researchers at the Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics published an open letter to the Russian authorities in which they stressed the patriotism of Maslov, Shiplyuk and Zvegintsev. The letter also suggested that the men had been prosecuted for sharing research with the wider international community, which they said was considered “an obligatory component of conscientious and high-quality scientific activity”.

The authors of the letter, which is no longer available online and to which the authorities have not replied, went on to say that: “We are not only afraid for the fate of our colleagues. We simply don’t know how to continue doing our job.”

The silence from the wider Russian scientific community has been deafening, however, with no other institutes or organisations making public statements of support for the scientists implicated in the Novosibirsk treason cases. Indeed, for now, the Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics appears to be the sole body unafraid to speak up for its persecuted colleagues.

Archive link

Hungary’s government signed an accord with Belarus to help build Hungary’s second nuclear plant, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó said in a statement in Minsk on Wednesday (29 May).

Hungary’s PAK 2 reactor has been under construction by Russia’s Rosatom since 2014. The Russian company is building two reactors with a capacity of 1.2 gigawatts each at PAKS 2 in central Hungary.

“Of great importance is the agreement signed here today on nuclear energy cooperation, which allows us to use the experiences Belarus gained here while constructing reactors with a similar technology,” Szijjártó said, without giving further details on the accord.

The €12.5 billion project has experienced long delays, even though nuclear power is not covered by European Union sanctions against Russia, imposed over the war in Ukraine.

Hungary, which gets most of its power from Russia, has opposed expanding sanctions to include the sector.

Belarus is not only under EU sanctions, it is also under diplomatic isolation, Szijjártó becoming the first top official from an EU country to visit Minsk after the West slapped it with sweeping sanctions following the August 2020 presidential election.

The EU does not recognise the results of Belarus’ presidential elections of 8 August 2020 and condemns them as neither free nor fair. It considers that Aleksandr Lukashenko lacks any democratic legitimacy.

Szijjártó also criticised a proposal from some of Hungary’s European and NATO counterparts to send their soldiers to Ukraine to train forces inside the country.

“I am abhorred by the statements that say that EU, NATO countries are sending soldiers to Ukraine,” he said.

European Union defence ministers on Tuesday debated the idea of training Ukrainian forces inside the country but did not reach a common position on the sensitive issue.

The 27-nation bloc already has such a mission for Ukrainian troops, but the training takes place in EU countries.

Hungary’s government has strained relations with Kyiv and has maintained better ties with Moscow than other EU states since Russia’s invasion two years ago.

Hungary will take over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU from 1 July.

At least seven journalists and activists who have been vocal critics of the Kremlin and its allies have been targeted inside the EU by a state using Pegasus, the hacking spyware made by Israel’s NSO Group, according to a new report by security researchers.

The targets of the hacking attempts – who were first alerted to the attempted cyber-intrusions after receiving threat notifications from Apple on their iPhones – include Russian, Belarusian, Latvian and Israeli journalists and activists inside the EU.

Pegasus is considered one of the most sophisticated cyberweapons in the world, and is operated by countries who acquire the technology from NSO. The company says it is meant to be used for legitimate reasons, such as fighting crime. But researchers have documented hundreds of cases in which operators of the spyware, including states inside the EU, have allegedly used it for other purposes, including spying on political opponents and journalists.

Researchers said they could not definitively identify the state or state agency behind the latest hacking attempts, but they said technical indicators suggested the attempts may have been made by the same NSO client. The developments follow a similar report last year that found Pegasus spyware had been used by an operator inside the EU to target Galina Timchenko, the award-winning Russian journalist and co-founder of the news website Meduza.

The investigation into the latest attempted cyber-attacks was conducted by the digital civil rights campaigners Access Now, the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto’s Munk School, and Nikolai Kvantaliani, an independent security analyst.

When it is successfully deployed, Pegasus can hack into any phone, access photos and mobile phone calls, detect a person’s location, and activate a user’s recorder, turning the phone into a listening device.

The company was placed on a blacklist by the Biden administration in 2021. It is also being sued by WhatsApp and Apple, in cases that it has disputed and that are being litigated in US courts.

While Russia might seem to be the most logical possible state behind the latest series of attacks, researchers have focused their attention within the EU and say they do not believe that Russia or Belarus are NSO customers. While Latvia appears to have access to Pegasus, it is not known for targeting individuals outside its borders. Estonia is also a known user of Pegasus and, researchers said, appears to use the spyware “extensively” outside its borders, including in Europe.

One Russian target, a journalist who lives in exile in Vilnius and has decided to remain anonymous due to personal safety concerns, received two Apple threat notifications, with the latest on 10 April 2024, according to the researchers. An analysis of the journalist’s mobile phone confirmed an attempted infection on 15 June 2023. The journalist attended a conference for Russian journalists in exile in Riga, Latvia the next day, focusing on the vulnerabilities facing journalists in the region.

Two Belarusian members of civil society living in Warsaw also received Apple notifications on 31 October 2023. Opposition politician and activist Andrei Sannikov, who ran for the presidency of Belarus in 2010 and was arrested and held by the Belarusian KGB after the poll, had his phone infected on or about 7 September 2021. It was not discovered for two years, he said.

"Even if it is Estonia or Lithuania, or Latvia or Poland, it does not exclude that it is the FSB or KGB [behind it],” Sannikov said. Asked whether the spate of attacks indicated that an intelligence or law enforcement agency within the EU had been infiltrated by Russia or its allies, he added: “Yes of course. It is I think common knowledge that the western institutions are heavily infiltrated and so [are] opposition circles, as well.”

Natalia Radzina, editor-in-chief of the independent Belarusian media website Charter97.org, and winner of the international press freedom award from the Committee to Protect Journalists, was infected with Pegasus twice in late 2022 and in early 2023.

Radzina called the infections a violation of privacy that was reminiscent of previous intrusions in Belarus, where she was politically persecuted and imprisoned by the KGB.

“I know that for many years my absolutely legal journalistic activity can only be of interest to the Belarusian and Russian special services, and I am only afraid of possible cooperation in this matter between the current operators, whoever they are, with the KGB or the FSB,” she said.

Three other journalists living in Riga also received Apple threat notifications: Evgeny Erlikh, an Israeli-Russian journalist; Evgeny Pavlov, a Latvian journalist, and Maria Epifanova, general director of Novaya Gazeta Europe.

NSO, which is regulated by the Israel’s ministry of defence, says it sells its spyware to vetted law enforcement agencies strictly for the purposes of preventing crime and terror attacks. It said it could not confirm or deny the identities of any alleged specific customers, but that it wanted to emphasise that NSO only sells its products to “allies of Israel and the US”.

The company also provided the Guardian with a copy of a letter it had sent to Ivan Kolpakov, the editor-in-chief of Meduza, in response to his letter to the company. NSO’s deputy general counsel Chaim Gelfand said the company was “deeply troubled by any allegation of potential misuse of our system” and said he would immediately review information Kolpakov had provided to him and initiate an investigation “if warranted”. The company could not, he said, substantiate or refute any allegations without additional information.

Gelfand added: “NSO Group is committed to upholding human rights and protecting vulnerable individuals and communities, including journalists who play a crucial role in promoting and protecting these rights.”

The linked article provides further links to media report in several European languages.

- Most political parties in Europe rely heavily on state subsidies, but not in Germany where they get hundreds of millions of euros from private individuals and companies.

- For only three out of every 10 euros European political parties receive from individuals and companies the name of the donor is made public. This means that 660 million euros is unaccounted for.

- Populist, far-right and far-left political parties receive a quarter of all the private funding, showing that with more political power also comes more money. That’s what Follow the Money, in collaboration with newsrooms from across Europe, collected and scrutinised to get a comprehensive insight into how much money goes to political parties in Europe for the very first time.

- Mugur Isarescu, in office since 1990, to get eighth term - Lawmakers aim for vote on rate-setting panel by end of June

Romania’s Mugur Isarescu, the world’s longest-serving central bank governor, is poised to be confirmed for a new five-year term as lawmakers seek a vote on the extension by the end of June.

Isarescu took over the leadership of the National Bank of Romania in 1990, less than a year after the collapse of Nicolae Ceausescu’s communist regime, and has served for over three decades except for a yearlong stint as prime minister in 1999 and 2000.

The 74-year-old has the backing of the largest parties in parliament to stay on for another term, according to people familiar with the discussion who asked not to be identified as deliberations weren’t public. The vote on Romania’s nine-member rate-setting panel will take place after local and European Parliament elections on June 9, they said.

Isarescu stopped short of confirming his candidacy for an eighth term earlier this month, though said he’d accept an invitation should parliament back him. The governor has been grappling with the highest inflation in the European Union. He’s dialed back expectations of rapid interest-rate cuts, urging the government to rein in a budget deficit forecast at 5% of economic output this year.

Policymakers in Bucharest unexpectedly held the benchmark interest rate at 7% on May 13, defying expectations among most economists surveyed for a 25 basis-point cut.

As part of the parliamentary vote on the panel, Deputy Governor Leonardo Badea is likely to take over the first-deputy role from Florin Georgescu, who will remain on the board, according to those familiar. Ionut Dumitru, chief economist for Raiffeisen Bank Romania and a former head of the fiscal council, has the support for a deputy governor post, replacing Eugen Nicolaescu, they said.

Some of the existing board members, such as Cristian Popa and Csaba Balint, will likely also have their mandates renewed, while presidential adviser Cosmin Marinescu may also join the team, the people said.

Opposition lawmaker Claudiu Nasui confirmed that the vote will take place by the end of June — and his USR party will support Popa for a new term on the central bank’s board.

A spokesman for the central bank declined to comment.

German environmental activists are facing increasingly harsh rhetoric and legal action from authorities as they mobilize to confront the climate crisis.

Last week, on May 21, Germany’s efforts to curb environmental activism took a disturbing turn when authorities used an offence typically reserved for prosecutorial pursuit of serious organized crime to indict Letzte Generation (Last Generation), a climate activist group known for disruptive protests such as roadblocks and other acts of civil disobedience, as a criminal organization. A conviction under federal law would pave the way for prosecuting anyone who participates in or supports Letzte Generation, including administratively or financially.

"This heavy-handed approach reflects a troubling trend in Europe of stifling civil society and climate activism", Human Rights,Watch says.

"Such actions chill public participation in protests against state policies or state inaction on a range of urgent issues."

The investigation into Letzte Generation as a criminal organization has involved armed police conducting predawn raids, storming private apartments while the activists were still asleep, and granting warrants for police to surveil the group’s communications, including calls made with media.

Last year the group’s website was temporarily seized during a fundraising campaign, with a notice from the police falsely labeling Letzte Generation a criminal organization and stating any donation constitutes illegal support for crime. This move by the police, despite no judicial assessment of the charges having taken place, exposes a deeply worrying bias against the group and raises questions about whether authorities are respecting due process.

International law protects the right to public participation in environmental matters and recognizes peaceful, nonviolent civil disobedience as a legitimate form of assembly. Disruptions like traffic blockades, while inconvenient, generally do not constitute violence under international standards, although damage to or destruction of private or public property may.

While civil disobedience often involves breaking national laws, authorities are required to respond proportionately, giving due weight to the right to protest and the importance to the public interest of the issues at stake.

The government’s extreme response to Letzte Generation’s activism appears disproportionate, threatens the very right to protest, and smears climate activists when their cause has never been more urgent. Instead of intimidating environmental defenders, Germany should live up to its commitment to ambitious climate action and investigate the concerns that groups like Letzte Generation raise.

- Volkswagen (VW) in 2023 commissioned a deeply flawed audit at a plant in China's Xinjiang province operated by a subsidiary of Volkswagen’s joint venture with SAIC, a Chinese state-owned carmaker.

- Although the audit found “no indications” of forced labor, audit manager Markus Löning, Germany’s former commissioner for human rights, conceded that the basis for the audit had been a review of documentation rather than interviews with workers, which he said could be “dangerous.”

- Löning added that “even if they [Chinese workers] would be aware of something [like forced labour], they cannot say that in an interview.”

- The NGO Human Rights Watch says that "the Chinese government’s pervasive surveillance and repression in Xinjiang means audits cannot credibly verify whether the facilities in the region are free from forced labor".--

Volkswagen should inform shareholders at its May 29, 2024 annual general meeting how the company plans to eliminate Uyghur forced labor in its operations and supply chains, Human Rights Watch and the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) said today.

Since 2017, the Chinese government has perpetrated crimes against humanity in the northwestern Xinjiang region and subjected Uyghurs and other Turkic communities to forced labor inside and outside the region. Aluminum and other key materials used in car manufacturing are produced in Xinjiang by companies with links to government forced labor programs.

“Volkswagen’s ‘In China, for China’ strategy shouldn’t mean complicity in forced labor,” said Jim Wormington, senior researcher and advocate for corporate accountability at Human Rights Watch. “Shareholders should call upon Volkswagen to ensure that it will apply robust measures to tackle Uyghur forced labor in its supply chains.”

Volkswagen, which manufactures cars in China through joint ventures with Chinese carmakers, is failing to adequately investigate potential links between its supply chains in China and forced labor. The company in 2023 also commissioned a deeply flawed audit at a plant in Xinjiang operated by a subsidiary of Volkswagen’s joint venture with SAIC, a Chinese state-owned carmaker. The Chinese government’s pervasive surveillance and repression in Xinjiang means audits cannot credibly verify whether the facilities in the region are free from forced labor.

Volkswagen sells one in three of its cars in China. Volkswagen’s chief executive, Oliver Blume, on April 24 described China as the company’s “second home market.” Blume also announced the company’s updated “In China, for China” strategy, which includes expanded partnerships with Chinese car manufacturers, reduced manufacturing costs, and ambitious sales targets.

Volkswagen said in December 2023 that an audit overseen by Markus Löning, Germany’s former commissioner for human rights, found “no indications” of forced labor at the Xinjiang joint venture plant, which is used to road test cars assembled elsewhere in China. Löning conceded, however, that the basis for the audit had been a review of documentation rather than interviews with workers, which he said could be “dangerous.” He also said that “even if they [workers] would be aware of something, they cannot say that in an interview.”

Following the release of the audit, the German newspaper Handelsblatt on February 14 alleged that a contractor of a SAIC-Volkswagen Xinjiang subsidiary had used Uyghur forced labor during the construction of a Xinjiang test track, which was completed in 2019. In response, Volkswagen said that the 2023 audit of the Xinjiang plant did not include the test track, but that “to date, we have had no indications of human rights violations in connection with the test site.”

Volkswagen also said in February that it is “currently in talks with the non-controlled joint venture SAIC-Volkswagen regarding the future direction of the JVs [joint ventures] business activities in Xinjiang Province. Various scenarios are currently being examined intensively.” Shareholders should ask Volkswagen about the outcome of those discussions and push for the company to end its joint venture operations in Xinjiang.

The production of key materials for car manufacturing in Xinjiang also creates a risk that Volkswagen is sourcing products or materials linked to forced labor, both in factories across China and globally. Nearly 10 percent of the world’s aluminum, for example, is produced in Xinjiang before being shipped out, melted down, and made into products and parts used by car manufacturers and other industries. Aluminum producers in Xinjiang, and in the coal mines and coal plants that supply them, have participated in coercive labor transfers, a form of state-imposed forced labor.

In June 2023, ECCHR filed a complaint with the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle, BAFA), the German government authority overseeing the country’s Supply Chain Act. The complaint contends that Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz are violating their obligations under the law by failing to adopt appropriate measures to identify and prevent the risks of state-imposed forced labor in their supply chains. The BAFA has not yet responded publicly to the complaint.

Volkswagen in January told United States customs officials that a small electronic part was produced by a sub-supplier listed by US authorities in December 2023 as linked to Uyghur forced labor. US customs officials impounded vehicles containing the part while Volkswagen replaced it. Human Rights Watch asked Volkswagen on May 22 whether it has removed the part in vehicles sold outside the US but did not receive a response. A US Senate Finance Committee report in May found that Volkswagen had previously investigated the sub-supplier in 2020 and 2022 but found no connections to its supply chain.

Volkswagen is applying inadequate oversight to the supply chains of its Chinese joint ventures, such as SAIC-VW, which primarily manufacture cars for sale in China, the organizations said. Volkswagen contends that, under Germany’s supply chain law, it is not legally required to address human rights impacts in SAIC-VW’s supply chain because its joint venture agreement cedes operational control to SAIC.

Volkswagen in November 2023 told Human Rights Watch that the company “assumes responsibility … to use its leverage over its Chinese joint ventures to address the risk of human rights abuses.” But when asked about potential links between SAIC-Volkswagen and an aluminum producer in Xinjiang, Volkswagen responded: “We have no transparency about the supplier relationships of the non-controlled shareholding SAIC-Volkswagen.”

Volkswagen’s updated China strategy continues to rely on joint ventures and includes partnerships with SAIC and Chinese electric carmaker XPENG. ECCHR’s complaint said that cars manufactured by joint ventures should be considered as being part of Volkswagen’s supply chain, and therefore fall within the scope of its due diligence obligation under the German Supply Chain Act. Human Rights Watch asked Volkswagen on May 22 what steps it will take to ensure that strong human rights and responsible-sourcing standards apply to all current and future joint venture operations in China, but did not receive a reply.

“Volkswagen can’t simply wash its hands of responsibility for its Chinese joint ventures in full knowledge of the risks of forced labor,” said Chloé Bailey, senior legal advisor at ECCHR. “Shareholders should ask Volkswagen how it is responding to increased scrutiny over its operations in China and what steps it is taking to comply with its obligations under the German Supply Chain Act.”

cross-posted from: https://sopuli.xyz/post/13133455

It used to be that you could insert a coin into a washing machine and it would simply work. Now some Danish and German apartment owners have decided it’s a good idea to remove the cash payment option. So you have to visit a website and top-up your laundry account before using the laundry room.

Is this wise?

Points of failure with traditional coin-fed systems:

1. your coin gets stuck
2. you don’t have the right denomination of coins

Points of failure with this KYC cashless gung-ho digital transformation system:

1. your internet service goes down
2. the internet service of the laundry room goes down
3. the website is incompatible with your browser
4. the website forces 3rd party JavaScript that’s either broken or you don’t trust it
5. you cannot (or will not) solve CAPTCHA
6. the website rejects your IP address because it is a shared IP
7. the payment processor rejects your IP address because it is a shared IP
8. the bank rejects your IP address because it is a shared IP
9. the payment processor is Paypal and you do not want to share sensitive financial data with 600 corporations
10. the accepted payment forms do not match your payment cards
11. the accepted payment form matches, but your card is still rejected anyway for one of many undisclosed reasons:
    • your card is on the same network but foreign cards are refused
    • the payment processor does not like your IP address
    • the copy of your ID doc on file with the bank expired, and the bank’s way of telling you is to freeze your card
    • it’s one of these new online-only bank cards with no CVV code printed on the card so to get your CVV code you must install their app from Google’s Playstore (this expands into 20+ more points of failure)
12. your bank account is literally below the top-up minimum because you only have cash and your cashless bank does not accept cash deposits; so you cannot do laundry until you get a paycheck or arrange for an electronic transfer from a foreign bank at the cost of an extortionate exchange rate
13. you cannot open a bank account because Danish banks refuse to serve people who do not yet have their CPR number (a process that takes at least 1 month).
14. you are unbanked because of one of 24 reasons that Bruce Schneier does not know about
15. the internet works when you start the wash load, but fails sometime during the program so you cannot use the dryers; in which case you suddenly have to run out and buy hanging mechanisms as your wet clothes sit.
16. (edit) the app of your bank and/or the laundry service demands a newer phone OS than you have, and your phone maker quit offering updates.

In my case, I was hit with point of failure number 11. Payment processors never tell you why your payment is refused. They either give a uselessly vague error, or the web UI just refuses to move forward with no error, or the error is an intentional lie. Because e.g. if your payment is refused you are presumed to be a criminal unworthy of being informed.

Danish apartment management’s response to complaints: We are not obligated to serve you. Read the terms of your lease. There is a coin-operated laundromat 1km away.

Question: are we all being forced into this shitty cashless situation in order to ease the hunt for criminals?

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the name of blue-blooded Polish businessman Andre Mankowski has disappeared from the website of the Moscow-based IT company AMT Group, where he was formerly listed as president. Yet reporters found the EU citizen has continued to make money from the firm, which does business with Putin’s sanctioned regime.

> - Polish businessman Andre Mankowski, who is also a French citizen, has received payments worth almost $3 million in the past two years from Moscow-based companies AMT Group and AMT Group Telecom.

> - AMT Group has continued to do business with banks and other entities under U.S. and European sanctions since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

> - Mankowski founded AMT Group and was listed as its owner in public documents as recently as 2019. The company’s current ownership, however, could not be confirmed.

> - In the past two decades the Mankowski family, which is descended from Polish aristocracy, has poured money into a spa resort in the mountains of southern Poland. The company that manages the spa denies any of the funds have come from AMT Group.

Terry Reintke, the German Green MEP chair, said her group would “absolutely” not support von der Leyen – the incumbent centre-right commission president who is seeking a second term – if she made a deal with the Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni’s group in the European parliament, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR).

Reintke warned that if von der Leyen joined forces with the ECR, which has repeatedly voted against EU green policies, the EU’s plan to tackle the climate crisis would be in danger. “It’s much more likely that the green deal will be killed, or at least slowed down”. She said this would be “a disaster not only for the climate, but also for the economic standing of Europe” in the face of intense competition from the US and China.

"Ursula von der Leyen – when you look at her track record – she very often is a politician that follows the zeitgeist,” Reintke claimed. “And the zeitgeist in 2019 was towards green Europe. Now she has a lot of pressure from her own political group, and we know that EPP wants to turn back and basically say we do business as usual.”

Von der Leyen has twice refused to rule out working with Meloni, who she described as “clearly pro-European”. Rival candidates have excoriated von der Leyen for failing to mention the complaints of Italian journalists who have alleged “suffocating control” from Meloni’s government over their work. Von der Leyen has also glossed over the Italian government’s restrictions on LGBTQ+ rights, merely saying she took a “completely different approach”.

- Russian metal producers have primarily adopted blockchain-based alternatives to conventional payment systems to maintain their trading operations

- Previously, the Bank of Russia had considered a complete ban on all cryptocurrencies, but in November, Russian central bank governor Elvira Nabiullina said she supports experimenting with such payments in international transactions

Russian commodity firms have increasingly turned to cryptocurrency to circumvent financial hurdles posed by international sanctions.

With traditional banking channels facing challenges, companies are now leveraging stablecoins, notably Tether (USDT), to facilitate “seamless and swift cross-border transactions” with their Chinese counterparts, as reported by Bloomberg.

Major Russian metal producers have primarily adopted this transition, seeking efficient alternatives to conventional financial systems to maintain their trading operations.

How Stablecoins Are Transforming International Trade Finance

These developments respond to the extended economic ramifications of international sanctions following geopolitical tensions that began in early 2022.

According to Bloomberg, despite not being directly targeted by sanctions, these firms have encountered substantial obstacles in conducting business internationally, particularly in receiving payments and acquiring necessary materials and equipment.

Notably, adopting stablecoins appears to be a strategic move to preserve business continuity and mitigate the risks associated with frozen bank accounts and the slow pace of traditional banking transactions.

As disclosed, the appeal of using stablecoins like Tether’s USDT lies in their ability to facilitate transactions quickly and cheaply. Ivan Kozlov, a digital currency expert and co-founder at Resolv Labs, explained:

With stablecoins, the transfer may take just 5-15 seconds and cost a few cents, making such transactions pretty efficient when the sender already has an asset base in stablecoins.

Furthermore, Kozlov revealed that the use of cryptocurrencies in trade finance is gaining traction among unsanctioned firms and as a broader practice in countries facing financial restrictions or dollar “liquidity issues.”

This highlights a growing recognition of cryptocurrency’s potential to serve as a “reliable” medium for substantial international transactions, especially in environments where traditional financial systems pose considerable operational challenges.

Russia’s Current Crypto Stance

Meanwhile, integrating cryptocurrencies into Russia’s trade mechanisms also signifies a change in the country’s regulatory stance towards digital assets.

Bloomberg noted that initially skeptical, the Russian central bank has shifted its view, recognizing the potential benefits of cryptocurrencies in circumventing financial barriers.

The report read:

Previously, the Bank of Russia had considered a blanket ban on the use and creation of all cryptocurrencies, but in November, Governor Elvira Nabiullina told parliament that she supports experimenting with such payments in international transactions.

Amidst these developments, strategic advisors like Gabor Gurbacs from Tether and VanEck have advocated for the broader adoption of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin by central banks, especially for those countries experiencing fiat currency devaluation.

Gurbacs suggests that adding Bitcoin to national reserves could provide economic stability and diversification, proposing that countries start allocating a small percentage to cryptocurrencies and gradually increasing their holdings.

Archived link

- Hungary takes over the rotating EU Council presidency on 1 July

- However, some EU diplomats say Hungary’s 'veto actions' might require a discussion about practical changes to the bloc’s decision-making processes

The foreign ministers gathered in Brussels focused on how the bloc could unlock funds from the EU’s off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF).

Hungary has been blocking partial reimbursements for weapons earmarked for Ukraine under the EU’s off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF) for almost a year, with the amount estimated at €6.5 billion – three reimbursement tranches and the new €5 billion-heavy Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF).

Budapest initially cited Ukraine’s anti-corruption agency for having blacklisted Hungary’s OTP Bank as an “international sponsor of war” as one of the main reasons for their blockage. But while the bank has since then been removed from the blacklist, Hungary has kept the veto in place.

“There is growing frustration (to say the least), as the EU currently sits on €5 billion of support and very soon on the [Russian] windfall profits stemming from immobilised assets, which are at risk of not being used properly if there is no agreement,” one EU diplomat said.

In Monday’s discussion, Budapest was now quoted as saying that its economy is being discriminated against in Ukraine, according to people familiar with the discussions. The new explanation had drawn significant pushback from other EU counterparts, they said.

Inside the room, Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock called on Budapest “to finally allow aid to Ukraine once again, because Europe is only strong if it is united.”

An increasing number of EU member states are starting to point to Hungary’s overall track record, rather than the fact that Budapest has ‘not yet completely vetoed’ any EU decision on Ukraine.

“We looked into this and about 41% of resolutions by the EU on Ukraine have been blocked by Hungary,” Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Gabrelius Landsbergis told reporters.

“The EPF is blocked; Ukraine’s accession talks are being held hostage by Hungary – and I could go on and on – the [EU’s] declaration on Georgia, the EPF [support] to Armenia – basically, almost all of our discussions and needed solutions and decisions (…) are being blocked by just one country,” Landsbergis said.

“We have to start seeing this as a systematic approach towards any efforts by the EU to have any meaningful role in foreign affairs – and we have to start talking about this,” he added.

Echoing the criticism, Belgium’s Foreign Minister Hadja Lahbib, whose country holds the EU’s rotating presidency, told reporters ahead of the talks: “We cannot accept that a single country, which also signed up to this amount a few months ago at the heads of state’s Council meeting, is now blocking this crucial aid for Ukraine.”

Estonia’s Foreign Margus Tsahkna said: “Every time we are coming here, we have to convince Hungary about not blocking very important initiatives.”

“This is crucial now for Ukraine, and also for Europe, to use these EPF funds,” Tsahkna added.

Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani told reporters Rome would be “against the blocking. We want to move on.”

Hungary’s Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto did not answer questions from reporters heading into Monday’s talks.

EU diplomats said they expect the discussion on EU military aid to Ukraine now to shift towards Tuesday’s defence ministers meeting.

Should there be no breakthrough, EU ambassadors “will come together when needed to unlock this very unfortunate situation,” a second EU diplomat said.

Hungary takes over the rotating EU Council presidency on 1 July.

However, some EU diplomats have said they see Hungary’s veto actions as a pattern of behaviour that might require a discussion about practical changes to the bloc’s decision-making processes.

With Monday’s discussion having for the first time addressed the ‘overall picture’ of Hungary’s actions, a growing number of member states would increasingly see this as becoming a serious problem, people familiar with the discussion said.

The man, identified only as Thomas H, had been a captain in the army's procurement office when he contacted Russian embassy in Berlin and passed on secret military information.

German police arrested him in the city of Koblenz in August and accused him of sharing photographs of munitions training systems and aircraft technology.

The 54-year-old admitted to a Düsseldorf court on Monday to passing information to Russia, saying it was a "stupid idea" and that he regretted his actions.

"It is the biggest mess I have ever made in my life," he told the court.

Prosecutors said the man approached the Russian embassy in Berlin and the consulate in Bonn unprompted and "almost persistently offered himself to Russia".

They said he photographed sensitive military files and dropped information through a letterbox at the consulate building in Bonn.

In a closing statement, the man said he had contacted the embassy after becoming concerned about the risk of nuclear war driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

He added that he was especially concerned that Germany's supply of heavy weapons to Ukraine could draw it into the conflict. According to government figures, Berlin supplied about €6.6bn (£5.62bn) worth of military hardware to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023. This included 40 Leopard 1 tanks and 100 infantry fighting vehicles.

The man claimed that chronic overwork had impaired his ability to think critically about his actions.

His lawyer said he had been influenced by a stream of pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation that he had been consuming on TikTok and Telegram at the time. He noted that his client had also joined the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party.

He added that the decision came during a four-day period "in which [his client] crossed red lines".

While prosecutors said the leaks had revealed sensitive military information, they noted that he had not disclosed state secrets, an act which would have attracted a much heavier lifetime sentence.

The trial comes as a slew of Russian spy affairs have hit headlines in Germany.

In April, two men with dual Russian-German citizenship were arrested, accused of spying on US army bases in Germany where Ukrainian soldiers were being trained.

Since December, an employee for German domestic intelligence, Carsten L, has been on trial accused of passing on classified data to Russian agents.

And in February 2023, a former security guard at the British embassy in Berlin was sentenced to 13 years in prison for passing on large amounts of sensitive information to the nearby Russian embassy.

The affairs have sparked a debate about whether security measures in Germany are tight enough. The government has admitted that more cases are likely to come to light.

In a recent television interview, Justice Minister Marco Buschmann said that Germany was a target for foreign powers. He added that over the next few months, more spies were likely to be “unmasked”.

France’s President Emmanuel Macron on Monday raised the alarm over the “ill wind” of the rise of the far right in European politics, during a state visit to Germany ahead of key EU elections.

European Union foreign ministers decided on Monday to impose sanctions on Russia's Federal Penitentiary Service and on 19 Russians for human rights violations after the death of opposition politician Alexei Navalny in a prison in February.

"Alexei Navalny’s shocking death was another sign of the accelerating and systematic repression by the Kremlin regime. We will spare no efforts to hold the Russian political leadership and authorities to account," EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell said in a statement.

The Kremlin has denied any state involvement in Navalny's death.

The sanctions include Russian judges, prosecutors and members of the judiciary. Their assets in the European Union, should they have any, are frozen and European companies are forbidden from making funds available to them.

The 19 people under sanctions also cannot enter, or transit through, the EU.

The new sanctions also restrict exports of equipment which might be used for internal repression and equipment, technology or software for use in information security and the monitoring or interception of telecommunication, the ministers said in a statement.